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1 Introduction
Over 16 million people are estimated to have died due to civil conicts in the second half of the
20th century (cf. Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Such events are geographically concentrated and highly
persistent: As many as 68 percent of all outbreaks took place in countries where multiple conicts
were recorded.1 This observation has motivated a large body of research searching for institutional
roots of civil conict. Yet, weak institutions are unlikely to be the sole explanation. For instance,
various studies show that democracy has no systematic e¤ect on the risk of civil war after controlling
for other factors such as ethnic diversity, GDP per capita and natural resource abundance.2 Moreover,
several developing countries with relatively solid institutions plunge into recurrent conicts, whereas
other countries with weak institutions and high ethnic cleavages never experience civil conicts.3
In this paper, we propose a theory based on asymmetric information and social learning, arguing
that cross-community distrust and pessimism about the viability of peaceful trade can make societies
fall into vicious spirals of violence and civil conicts. Consistent with this view, Figure 1 shows that a
country-level measure of average trust is negatively correlated with the frequency of civil wars during
the period 1981-2008.4 Clearly, causality can run both ways: whilst distrust between communities
increases the probability of civil conict, war erodes cross-community trust.
In our theory, the dynamic link between trust and conict operates through trade. On the one
hand, since conict disrupts cross-community business relationships (hereafter, trade), thriving trade
deters war by raising its opportunity cost. Conversely, scant trade opportunities make conict more
likely. On the other hand, trade hinges on trust. Many business relationships involving members
of di¤erent communities (e.g., seller-buyer, employer-employee, supplier-producer, lender-borrower)
require specic human-capital investments on both sides (e.g., learning the language or the customs
of the other group, maintaining a cross-community social network). How much each community is
prepared to invest depends then on the belief that the other community will also invest (hereafter,
trust). Therefore, trust fosters trade, which in turns deters civil conict.
We formalize our ideas with the aid of a dynamic model, in which two groups can engage in
1This number is based on the sample covered in Collier and Hoe­ er (2004). DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) nd
that even more than three quarters of all civil wars are due to "enduring internal rivalries" between ethnic groups that
repeatedly get into war against each other. See, among others, Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner
(2009), Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007), and Walter (2004), who have found that past wars are strong predictors of
future wars.
2See, e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), and Collier and Rohner (2008).
3Columbia, India, Turkey, Sri Lanka and the Philippines fare relatively well in terms of democracy and other insti-
tutional indicators, conditional on their stage of development. Yet, they are prone to civil conicts. Interestingly, the
average level of trust as measured by the World Values Survey is signicantly lower in these countries than in the average
non-OECD country (0.16 vs. 0.22). On the opposite front, Bhutan, Cameroon, Gabon, Kazahstan, Togo, China and
Vietnam have low scores on democracy and high ethnic fractionalization, but no recent history of civil war. Data on
trust are only available for China and Vietnam among these countries. Their average trust is 0.51, even larger than in
the average OECD country.
4Trust is a dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if Yesis replied to question A165 ("Can most people be trusted?")
of the World Values Survey (2010). The civil war data is from PRIO (2010). The correlation is robust to conditioning
on several covariates, including democracy.
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Figure 1: Country-Level Trust and Frequency of Civil War
inter-ethnic trade partnerships, necessitating human-capital investments on both sides in order to be
carried out successfully. There are strategic complementarities to such investments: The proportion
of investors in a group increases the other groups expected return to investments by increasing their
probability to nd trading partners. Investment costs are heterogenous across agents. The key pa-
rameter is a group-specic xed e¤ect, which pins down the average investment cost (propensity to
trade), and about which information is asymmetric: One group ignores the average propensity to
trade of the other group, and forms and updates beliefs about it. Finally, one group can stage war
against the other, at the cost of foregoing inter-ethnic trade in the current period. Not only does the
onset of a conict destroy current trade but it also undermines future trust and trade by signaling
to the victim group that the attacking group regards the opportunity cost of war as low, i.e., has a
low propensity to trade. Since beliefs are transmitted across generations, a war today reduces future
investments and trade, thereby increasing the probability of future conicts.
The theorys predictions are consistent with the negative correlation between war and trust in
Figure 1. They also imply that wars are persistent: each outbreak increases the probability that a
country will fall again into a civil war in the future. This is consistent with the empirical evidence
that peace duration reduces signicantly the risk of future civil war, even after controlling for country
xed e¤ects (see Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008b). Furthermore, "accidental wars", e.g., aggressions
initiated by a belligerent minority of a group against the will of the majority of the group itself, may
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lead to the permanent breakdown of peaceful relationships across groups even in spite of good economic
fundamentals. More precisely, repeated such episodes can trigger the collapse of trust, and plunge
a society into recurrent conicts (war traps) where inter-ethnic trade relationships are weak even in
peace times. This result is shown to be robust to di¤erent informational assumptions. While in our
benchmark model the only informative signal is the peace-and-war history, we relax the informational
assumptions in an extension where we allow traders to acquire direct information about the other
groups type. Learning traps are found to be robust in such an environment.
The analysis yields a number of policy implications. First, increasing the protability of inter-ethnic
trade reduces the probability of recurrent wars. Thus, policies abating barriers, such as educational
policies promoting the knowledge of several national languages, as well as subsidies to trade-enhancing
human-capital investments can help sustain peace. Second, policies targeting beliefs may be useful.
For instance, credible campaigns documenting and publicizing success stories of inter-ethnic business
relationships, joint ventures, etc. can reduce the probability of future conicts through changing
beliefs about trade opportunities. On the contrary, attempts to impose peace through coercion e.g.,
peacekeeping forces or externally-imposed regime changes have ultimately no persistent e¤ects. This
is consistent with empirical studies in the conict literature that we discuss in more detail below.
1.1 Motivating evidence
The war-deterring e¤ect of trade has been widely documented in the empirical literature (see, e.g.,
Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008a). While most formal evidence is about international trade, a number
of case studies document that inter-ethnic trade has a similar e¤ect within countries. In a seminal
study, Horowitz (2000) argues that strong economic inter-group complementarities create powerful
incentives for inter-ethnic peace. He shows that in various Asian countries like Indonesia, Myanmar,
Malaysia and India "middleman minorities" have often been protected from political violence, as they
provide very valuable services to the local ethnic majority. According to Horowitz (2000: 117), "by and
large, (...) the supposed economic resentments of businessmen by their customers often do not exist.
(...) Rather than resenting alien rural traders, peasants often welcome them". A similar conclusion
is reached by Jha (2008) who studies Hindu-Muslim interactions using town-level data for India. He
nds that during Medieval times in Indias trade ports Hindus and Muslims could provide each other
with complementary services, and argues that this led to religious tolerance and a lower level of
political violence in Medieval trade ports than in other Indian towns. Interestingly, such a situation
persists today. In a similar vein, Varshney (2001, 2002) argues that the existence of inter-ethnic civil
society involvement and business associations can curtail the potential for riots in India. According to
Varshney, for the prevention of ethnic conict "trust based on interethnic, not intraethnic, networks
is critical" (2001: 392). Bardhan (1997) provides anecdotal evidence of waning inter-ethnic business
links due to exogenous factors lowering the opportunity costs of conict, and resulting in the outbreak
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of riots.5
Also in other parts of the world one can observe that inter-ethnic trade prevents conict. Olsson
(2010) shows that an exogenous change in climatic conditions (i.e. a severe drought) has led to a
collapse of the inter-ethnic trade between farmers and herders in Sudans Darfur region, and that this
has been followed by the outbreak of conict.6 Similarly, Porter et al. (2010) carried out in-depth
interviews with market traders in Nigeria and have found that in the context of inter-ethnic tensions,
the existence of strong inter-ethnic trade links and associations can prevent the outbreak of full-blown
riots.
There is also evidence that war lowers future inter-group trust and trade. At the country-pair level,
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) provide causal evidence on the sample of European countries
that a more intense history of bilateral warfare over the 1000-1970 period reduces the current level
of bilateral trust; this in turn a¤ects negatively the current levels of bilateral trade, foreign direct
investments, and portfolio investments. Glick and Taylor (2010) use a larger panel of country pairs
and nd that inter-state wars have a strong and persistent disruptive e¤ect on future bilateral trade.
Within-country evidence is more scattered, since there are no formal statistics of inter-ethnic trade.
Yet, there are several telling case studies. In Rwanda throughout the 1980s inter-ethnic trust was high
and sustained symbiotic business relationships, cooperation in agricultural production associations
and mixed rotating savings groups involving both Hutus and Tutsis (Ingelaere, 2007; Pinchotti and
Verwimp, 2007). Survey data indicate that trust plunged as of October 1990, after localized ghting
erupted in northern Rwanda between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group formed from
Tutsi refugees in Uganda, and the Hutu-dominated government of Habyarimana (Ingelaere, 2007).
The collapse of trust was followed by waning trade and business links between the communities, until
inter-ethnic cooperation ceased altogether at the onset of the 1994 genocide.7 Even many years after
the conict the average inter-ethnic trust levels are signicantly lower than in the 1980s (Ingelaere,
2007) and also inter-ethnic trade is persistently lower (Colletta and Cullen, 2000).
Similarly, UNICEF (2003) documents that in several of Darfurs conicts inter-group trust and
inter-ethnic business have collapsed in the aftermath of ghting. For example, the civil war has resulted
in the breakdown of the traditional economic arrangements between nomads and farmers regulating
5"On the Moradabad riots of 1980: The higher wages in the brass industry and entrepreneurship brought about not
only greater prosperity among the Muslims, it also began to lessen the importance of the middlemen, often Hindu, in
business transactions. Some of the Muslim entrepreneurs even managed to get direct orders from West Asian countries.
The Hindu middlemen thus edged out began to rally round the Jan Sangh (now BJP) which has its base among petty
businessmen" (Bardhan, 1997: 1397).
6Also UNICEF (2003) nds that exogenous collapses in inter-ethnic markets have resulted in conicts in Darfur: "The
groups confronting each other in the current conicts have a long history of guarded cooperation and relative peaceful
coexistence. In the past, they exchanged goods and services; indeed some of the herds that the Arab nomads reared
belonged to wealthy Fur who did not opt to become nomads themselves. The Fur sold most of their herds on the onset
of the drought in 1982/83. This was considered a severance of economic relations, which strained the relations between
the Fur and the Arabs" (UNICEF, 2003: 53).
7Colletta and Cullen, (2000:45) nd that while vertical (within-group) social capital remained intact, "conict deeply
penetrated such forms of horizontal social capital as exchange, mutual assistance, collective action, trust and the pro-
tection of the vulnerable. [...] The use of credit in exchanges was common in preconict Rwanda. This practice has
diminished over time, in part due to decreased levels of trust as a consequence of warfare".
5
the use of pastureland and access to water in the Upper Nice region. This collapse of economic
cooperation spurred kidnappings and other forms of inter-ethnic violence, triggering an escalation of
further local conicts. The same pattern is also found elsewhere in Africa. Dercon and Gutierrez-
Romero (2010) study the 2007 Kenyan electoral violence. Their survey data indicate that violence
decreased trust between ethnic groups (while increasing trust within ethnic groups). Furthermore,
after episodes of violence, people indicated that they tend to do less business with people from other
ethnic groups and that they nd violence more justiable.
There are also case studies documenting the detrimental e¤ect of war on trust and trade in Europe.
Blagojevic (2009) nds that after the Bosnian war inter-ethnic trust collapsed and that the economic
cooperation between the Serbian population on the one hand and the Bosniak and Croatian population
on the other hand broke down, being replaced by intense inter-ethnic competition. Similarly, according
to Kaufman (1996) the war in Moldova led to a climate of distrust between the Moldavans and the
Russian-speaking minority, which resulted in a substantial decline in inter-ethnic business cooperation.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to di¤erent streams of economic literature. The link between trust, specic invest-
ments and business relationships is related to a large body of literature on contractual incompleteness
where successful economic relationships hinge on various forms of bilateral investments. The salience
of this issue in the context of cross-community trade is emphasized by Dixit (2003). In Hauk and
Saez Marti (2002) and Tabellini (2009) a costly investment leads to the adoption of pro-social norms
preventing opportunistic behavior; in Greif (1994) and Rauch (1999) it leads to the development of a
social network where reputation and retaliation can be enforced; in Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) it
leads to the acquisition of communication tools, such as the other groups customs and language.8
Learning traps are related to the literature on herding, social learning, and informational cas-
cades. This includes Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992); Ely and Valimaki
(2003); Fernandez (2007) and Piketty (1995). The theory is also related to the theoretical literature
on supermodular games with strategic complementarities (Baliga and Sjostrom, 2004; Chamley, 1999;
Chassang and Padro i Miquel, 2010 and Cooper and John, 1988). While most of these papers em-
phasize the possibility of static multiplicity, in our paper we constrain parameters to yield a unique
equilibrium under perfect information.9 The dynamic nature of the model of conict is related to
Yared (2010). The importance of luck and the persistent e¤ects of negative shocks link our contribu-
tion with Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Also related to our research are the recent papers by Aghion
et al. (2010) and Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2011) focusing on the relation between public policy, on
8See also the recent advertising campaign of HSBC branded "Never underestimate the importance of local knowledge",
emphasizing the importance and market value of a good knowledge of the system of customs, norms and social conventions
for inter-cultural business relationships.
9Among these papers, Chamley (1999) is the closest to us as he also studies coordination in a dynamic setting with
learning and strategic complementarities. However, in his model the dynamics are driven by exogenous changes in the
unobservable fundamentals and the possibility of persistence and absorbing states with learning traps is absent.
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the one hand, and beliefs and norms of cooperation in the labor market, on the other hand.10
This paper is also related more generally to the economic literature studying conict. Some
existing theories focus on institutional failures, such as weak state capacity and weak institutions
(Besley and Persson, 2010, 2011; Fearon, 2005). In Besley and Persson (2011) the lack of checks
and balances implies that rent-sharing strongly depends on who is in power, thereby strengthening
incentives to ght.11 Poverty and natural resource abundance have also been found to fuel conict, as
the former reduces the opportunity cost of ghting, while the latter results in a larger "pie" that can
be appropriated (cf. Torvik, 2002, and Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004). Esteban and Ray (2008) emphasize
the role of ethnic diversity, and argue that ethnic polarization can favor the collective action needed for
appropriation by generating the right mix of capital and labor for the groups. In Rohner (2011) ethnic
diversity increases the risk of conict by reducing the reputational cost of non-cooperative behavior.
While explaining why some countries are more prone to conicts than others, most of such theories
do not explain why a civil war today makes future conict more likely. An exception is Acemoglu,
Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) who argue that in weakly-institutionalized states civilian governments have
incentives to select small and weak armies to prevent coups. This has the undesired consequence of
making it harder for the state to end insurgency and rebellion. Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) argue that
current conict makes conict recurrence more likely due to the existence of conict-specic capital,
like cheap military equipment.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the benchmark model of inter-ethnic
trade and conict. Section 3 extends it to a dynamic environment where beliefs are transmitted across
generations, and derives the main results. Section 4 presents a major extension where agents can
learn from the observation of trade history together with warfare history. Section 5 discusses some
policy implications. Section 6 concludes and discusses avenues for future research. The proofs of all
Lemmas, Propositions and Corollaries are in the Appendix (proofs of Lemma 2 and Propositions 610
in a webpage Appendix).
2 The Static Model
2.1 Setup
The model economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral individuals belonging to two "ethnic
groups" (A and B), each of unit mass. The interactions between the two groups are described by a
two-stage game. First, group A decides whether or not to stage war against group B. Next, inter-ethnic
trade may occur. No economically interesting decisions are made under the shadow of war. In case of
10Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2011) document a negative empirical correlation between the quality of labor relations
and state regulation of the minimum wage. They explain this evidence with the aid of a model in which agents learn
about the quality of labor relations, and where state regulation prevents workers from learning through experimentation.
Their model features multiple equilibria: one characterized by good labor relations, and another characterized by low
trust and strong minimum wage regulation.
11Another stream of literature views civil wars as failure of bargaining processes due to private information (Fearon,
1995), commitment problems (Powell, 2006), issue indivisibilities or political bias of leaders (Jackson and Morelli, 2007).
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peace, each agent in group A is randomly matched with an agent in group B, and trade only occurs
if both agents have made a human capital investment prior to the match.12 In this case, each trading
partner receives a return z, where we assume that 0 < z  1.
Investment decisions are based on an ex-ante comparison between costs and benets. We dene
 to be the investment cost net of the return that accrues to the investor irrespective of trade (note
that  can be negative).  is heterogenous across agents reecting individual shocks to ability and
investment opportunities. It is assumed to be i:i:d: across agents, and to be drawn from a probability
density function (p.d.f.), fJ : R ! R+; where J 2 fA;Bg. We denote by F J : R ! [0; 1] the
corresponding cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.). Group A can be of two types: fA 2 ff+; f g;
and accordingly FA 2 fF+; F g, where F  rst-order stochastically dominates F+: Since investment
costs are a barrier to trade, we say that group A has a high propensity to trade (A is of the high type)
when FA = F+; and has a low propensity to trade (A is of the low type) when FA = F . Instead, we
assume that FB has a unique realization. This assumption is for tractability, as it avoids the di¢ culty
of a two-dimensional learning process.
We introduce a technical assumption that is maintained throughout the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1 There exists " > 0 such that the p.d.f.s fB () ; f+ () and f  (i) are non-decreasing
in the subrange  2 [0; z + "].
Assumption 1 ensures that, at least in the interval [0; z + "], there are fewer people with a low (or
negative) than with a high net investment cost. The implications of this assumption will be explained
in the next section.
The net benet of war to group A is assumed to be stochastic and is denoted by ~V 2 fVL; V; VHg:
~V is interpreted as the value of the resources grabbed through war minus the military or psychological
costs associated with war. Group As gains from trade that are foregone by staging war are denoted
by Sk 2 [S^min; S^max], where k 2 f+; g: Sk is the (endogenous) opportunity cost of war. Group A
decide whether or not to stage war by a unanimity rule. When war is decided upon, all agents in
group A know the realization of ~V ; but ignore the realization of their individual cost :
Assumption 2 VL < S^min < V < S^max < VH :
The intermediate realization, V; is the most frequent one, and is referred to as business as usual
(BAU). Under BAU, staging war is protable if V > Sk; and unprotable otherwise. VH corresponds
to a situation in which the military cost of making war is exceptionally low, implying that the benet
of war exceeds its opportunity cost. Conversely, VL corresponds to an unusually high cost to stage war,
due, e.g., to a failure in the collective action.13 As Sk  S^min; peace necessarily occurs when ~V = VL;
12We interpret this investment as the familiarization with the customs of the other community, such as learning a
foreign language, becoming aware of informal rules and traditions, getting in touch with external networks, etc.
13The stochastic process can alternatively be driven by shocks to the political process or psychological costs of conict.
When ~V = VH ; the perceived cost of staging war is low, due to an explosion of hatred (Gurr, 1970) or due to the capture
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likewise, as Sk  S^max, war erupts when ~V = VH . We refer to the infrequent realizations VH and VL
as a war shock and a peace shock, with probabilities W < 1=3 and P < 1=3, respectively. Hence,
the probability of BAU is 1  W   P > 1=3: These shocks echo the recent literature that views the
onset of war as "stochastic" (Gartzke, 1999), in particular due to stochastic shocks to coordination
costs of rebellion (Collier and Hoe­ er, 1998), or to rebel capability (Gates, 2002; Buhaug, Gates and
Lujala, 2009).
2.2 Perfect information
To establish a benchmark, we rst consider the case in which group As type is public knowledge.
In this case, war spoils trade but conveys no information. Consider the investment problem during
peace. Due to random matching, the expected gain from trade for an investor in group A is z  nB;
whereas the expected gain from trade for an investor in group B is z nA. Thus, all agents with   znB
(resp.   znA) in group A (resp. group B) invest. The Nash equilibrium conditional on group A
type, k 2 f+; g, is given by the xed pointn
nkA; n
k
B
o
=
n
F k(znkB); F
B(znkA)
o
(1)
Although the strategic complementarity in investments could yield multiple Nash equilibrium,
Assumption 1 is su¢ cient to ensure that the Nash equilibrium is unique under perfect information.
This restriction allows us to focus more sharply on the dynamic interaction between belief formation
and warfare.
The trade surplus accruing to group A if peace is maintained is given by
Sk  z  nkA  nkB  
Z znkB
dF k () (2)
where nkA nkB represents the number of successful trade relationships and
R znkB dF k () is the aggregate
investment cost. Note that the previous equation implies that necessarily Sk 2 [S^min; S^max] with
S^min =   R z dF+ () and S^max = z:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 and perfect information, the Nash Equilibrium of the invest-
ment/trade continuation game conditional on k 2 f+; g exists and is unique.
The equilibrium investments are given by fn A; n+A; n B; n+Bg consistent with equation (1), where n A 
n+A and n
 
B  n+B.
The equilibrium trade surplus accruing to group A is given by Sk  as described by (2). Moreover,
S   S+:
of the political process by a biased political elite (Jackson and Morelli, 2007). On the contrary, a temporary political
moderation or a high reluctance to start a conict would lead to ~V = VL: Yet another interpretation is that there are
shocks to the beliefs of group A about the net benets of war which are driven by the acquisition of private information.
This interpretation is related to Fearon (1995).
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Since S  < V < S+; the low type always stages war while the high type retains peace under BAU.
Thus, war is more frequent when k =   (probability is 1  P ) than when k = + (probability is W ).
2.3 Asymmetric Information
In the rest of the paper we assume that group B can observe neither group As type nor the realization
of ~V . In this environment, war has a signaling component: staging war signals a low propensity to
trade, although the signal is not perfectly revealing.14 For instance, if S  < V < S+ and war is
staged, group B cannot be sure that A is the low type, since war may have erupted due to a war
shock. We denote by  1 the prior belief held by group B that k = +. Beliefs are common knowledge,
and are updated using Bayesrule after the observation of war or peace. We denote by (W ; P ) the
posterior belief conditional on war and peace, respectively.
The timing of the game is the following.
1. The war stage: all agents in group B receive the prior belief  1, all agents in group A observe
the state ~V , and group A decides whether to stage war or to keep peace.
2. The investment/trade stage: agents in group B update their beliefs. If there is war, there are no
further choices and all agents receive their payo¤s. If there is peace, all agents in both groups
draw  from the distribution of net costs, and each of them decides in a decentralized way whether
or not to invest. Finally, the two groups are randomly matched to trade partners, gains from
trade are realized, and consumption occurs.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE).
Denition 1 A strategy for an agent in population A species for each of her possible types, k 2
f+; g and for each state ~V 2 fVL; V; VHg; a war action ("stage war" or "keep peace"), and, for
each possible realization of the investment cost, , an investment action ("invest" or "not invest"). A
strategy for an agent in population B species an "investment action" ("invest" or "not invest") for
each of the possible realizations of the investment cost, . A PBE is a strategy prole, a belief system
and a triplet
 
n A; n
+
A; nB
 2 [0; 1]3 such that: (i) in the investment/trade continuation game all agents
choose their investment so as to maximize the expected pay-o¤ given the posterior beliefs after peace
(P ) and the realization of the net investment cost ();
 
n A; n
+
A; nB

yields the associated measure of
agents who optimally invest in group A for each type, k 2 f+; g; and for group B, respectively. (ii)
all agents in group A choose unanimously the probability of staging war on group B so as to maximize
their expected utility, given group As type (k), the state ~V 2 fVL; V; VHg and beliefs ( 1), (iii) beliefs
are updated using Bayesrule.
14Note that ~V is neither observable ex-ante nor veriable ex-post to group B. Otherwise, the process of belief updating
would be more complicated. Also, the fact that each generation plays only once and that there is no intergenerational
altruism rules out the standard complications associated with signalling games.
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2.3.1 Investment/Trade Continuation Game
We solve the PBE backwards, starting from the Nash equilibrium of the investment/trade continu-
ation game under peace. Since the investments of agents in group A are subject to no uncertainty,
group As reaction function continues to be given by F k (znB) ; with k 2 f+; g. However, since nA
depends on the unknown type k, group B faces some uncertainty, and its reaction function becomes
FB (zEB(nA j P )) = FB
 
z

Pn
+
A + (1  P )n A

: The equilibrium proportions of investors in the
two groups satisfy the following xed point:
fn A; n+A; nBg = fF  (znB) ; F+ (znB) ; FB
 
z

PF
+ (znB) + (1  P )F  (znB)
g (3)
Proposition 2 characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the investment/trade game.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and given a belief P 2 (0; 1) ; the Nash Equilibrium of the
investment/trade continuation game conditional on k 2 f+; g exists and is unique.
The equilibrium investments are given by fn A (P ) ; n+A (P ) ; nB (P )g implicitly dened by equation
(3). n A (P ) ; n
+
A (P ) and nB (P ) are continuous and weakly increasing. Moreover, n
 
A (P ) 
n+A (P ).
The equilibrium trade surplus accruing to group A, Sk (P ) ; is given by (2) and is weakly increasing
in P : Moreover, S  (P )  S+ (P ) :
Note that trust a¤ects the investments of both groups, due to the strategic complementarity.
Pessimistic beliefs (i.e., low P ); induce agents in group B to expect that only few agents in group A
will invest, determining a low nB. In turn, a low nB reduces the proportion of investors in group A,
whatever its true type k 2 f ;+g. As a result both S+ and S  are increasing in trust. Figure 2 plots
the functions S+ (P ) and S  (P ) in the case of a uniform distribution of investment costs.15
2.3.2 War Decision and PBE
In this subsection, we analyze the decision of group A of whether or not to stage war. As discussed
above, such decision is based on a comparison between the opportunity cost of war, given by (2), and
the stochastic realization of its benet, ~V . Since S+ and S  depend on posterior beliefs, we must rst
characterize the belief-updating process. To this aim it is useful to rescale beliefs in term of likelihood
ratio and to introduce some new notation.
Notation 1 (i) rW (r 1) and rP (r 1) denote the mapping from prior to posterior likelihood ratios
conditional on war and peace, respectively, where r 1   1= (1   1) and rs  s= (1  s) for
s 2 fW;Pg.
(ii) + (r 1) and   (r 1) denote the probability that peace is maintained under BAU by the high and
low type, respectively.
15 In particular, we set z = 0:9 and assume a uniform distribution of investment costs on the following supports:
FB  [0; 1], F+  [ 0:25; 1], F   [0; 1:25].
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Proposition 2 and all ensuing results in the previous section can be expressed in terms of this new
notation by replacing P by rP = (1 + rP ) in each expression. Bayesrule implies that16
ln rP (r 1) = ln r 1 + ln
P + (1  W   P )+ (r 1)
P + (1  W   P )  (r 1) ; (4)
ln rW (r 1) = ln r 1   ln 1  P   (1  W   P )
  (r 1)
1  P   (1  W   P )+ (r 1) ; (5)
where k (r 1) is the key choice variable:17
k (r 1) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if Sk

rP (r 1)
1+rP (r 1)

< V
2 [0; 1] if Sk

rP (r 1)
1+rP (r 1)

= V
1 if Sk

rP (r 1)
1+rP (r 1)

> V
: (6)
Intuitively, peace (war) is chosen with probability one under BAU whenever Sk > V (Sk < V ). If
Sk = V agents are indi¤erent, and the Nash equilibrium may involve mixed strategies. Proposition 3
establishes the existence of the PBE (the proof follows immediately from Proposition 2 and is omitted).
Proposition 3 A PBE exists and is fully characterized by the set of equations (2), (3), (4), (5), (6),
given a prior belief  1 and the denitions in Notation 1.
To see how beliefs are updated along the equilibrium path, note that when either V < S  (P )
or V > S+ (P ) the probability of war is independent of group As type: if V < S  (P ) ; then
both types retain peace under BAU (+ (r 1) =   (r 1) = 1), while if V > S+ (P ) ; then both
types stage war under BAU (+ (r 1) =   (r 1) = 0). Therefore, in either of these two cases
the observation of war or peace does not a¤ect beliefs. On the contrary, war/peace is informative
whenever S  (P )  V  S+ (P ) where one inequality is necessarily strict. In this case, the low
type would stage war whereas the high type would preserve peace under BAU (+ (r 1) = 1 and
  (r 1) = 0). Thus, peace strengthens the trust of group B towards group A, while war undermines
it. More formally, S  (P )  V  S+ (P ) , P >  1 > W : We refer to this situation as an
informative PBE.
Denition 2 Given  1 (and, hence, r 1), a PBE is "informative" i¤ + (r 1) >   (rP ), or iden-
tically, rP (r 1) > r 1 > rW (r 1) : A PBE is "uninformative" (or a "learning trap") i¤ + (r 1) =
  (rP ) ; or identically rP (r 1) = r 1 = rW (r 1) :
16After peace, the posterior is given by ln rP = ln r 1+ln+P =
 
P where 
k
P represents the probability of observing peace
if the true type is k 2 f+; g. Peace signal is observed with certainty under a peace shock (an event of probability P ) or
with probability k(r 1) under BAU (an event of probability 1 P  W ): Hence, kP  P +(1  W   P )k (r 1) :
Similarly, the after-war posterior is ln rW = ln r 1 + ln+W =
 
W where 
k
W  W + (1  W   P )
 
1  k (r 1)

:
17For instance, if under BAU the high type nds it optimal to keep peace (+ (r 1) = 1) while the low type nds it
optimal to stage war (  (r 1) = 0), then rP = ((1  W ) =P )  r 1; where the updating factor after peace is given by
the probability of no war shock divided by the probability of a peace shock. Conversely, rW = (W = (1  P ))  r 1;
where the updating factor after war is given by the probability of a war shock divided by the probability of no peace
shock.
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Figure 2: Surplus from trade and gains from war as function of the posterior belief
Figure 2 plots the functions S+ (P ) and S  (P ) for the particular example mentioned before,
and a particular value of the parameter V . Note that war/peace is informative if and only if P  P :
if P < P , pessimistic beliefs are not updated and peace is viewed as an accident due to a shock.
Note also that S+ and S  are functions of the posterior P , which is endogenous. We now discuss
the equilibrium mapping from prior to posterior.
Notation 2 Let
r (V ) 
(
(S+) 1(V )
1 (S+) 1(V ) if V  S+ (0)
0 if V < S+ (0)
; r (V )  P
1  W r
 (V ) (7)
r (V ) 
8<: (S
 )
 1
(V )
1 (S ) 1(V ) if V  S  (1)
1 if V > S  (1)
; r (V )  P
1  W r (V ) ; (8)
where r (V ) < r (V ) < r (V ) < r (V ) :
Intuitively, r (V ) is the threshold posterior belief such that both types stage war under BAU if
rP  r (V ). As long as r 1  P1 W r (V ) ; the posterior can be larger or equal to r (V ) : Likewise,
r (V ) is the threshold posterior belief such that both types retain peace under BAU if rP  r (V ) : As
long as r 1  P1 W r (V ) ; the posterior can be larger or equal to r (V ). Given these denitions, the
following Lemma can be established.
Lemma 1 An uninformative PBE exists if and only if either r 1  r (V ) or r 1  r (V ) : Informative
PBE exist if and only if r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]: If r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]; then there are multiple PBE.
Otherwise, the PBE is unique.
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Uninformative PBE are associated to either very pessimistic or very optimistic priors. Intuitively,
when trust is very low (high), trade opportunities are scant (abundant) and both the high and the low
type stage war (keep peace) under BAU. Informative PBE arise in an intermediate range of beliefs,
although the range may be open to the right as in the case in Figure 2. Two ranges of priors have
special properties: r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )] and r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]: When r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )], the
mapping from priors to posteriors yields multiple PBE, of which one is uninformative and two are
informative. When r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )], the mapping from priors to posteriors yields a unique PBE,
but this involves randomization of the low type (  (r 1) 2 (0; 1)). See the proof for details. The
webpage Appendix also provides an intuitive discussion of the set of PBE in these two ranges. For
the sake of the dynamic analysis, the (small) region of multiple PBE is the source of uninteresting
technical complications. While none of our results depends on a specic selection criterion, we make
the following convenient assumption.
Assumption 3 In the range of prior beliefs such that multiple PBE exists, the most informative
equilibrium is selected.
Since the rest of our analysis emphasizes the possibility for economies to fall into uninformative
equilibria, this is a conservative selection criterion.
3 The Dynamic Model
In this section, we extend the analysis to a dynamic economy populated by overlapping generations of
two-period lived agents. In the rst period of their lives (childhood) agents make no economic choice,
and receive the common belief from their parentsgeneration. In the second period (adulthood) agents
make all economic decisions. After group A decide whether or not to stage war, adult agents in group
B update their beliefs, make investment decisions and (if no war has erupted) trade, and transmit
their updated beliefs to their children. We assume that all agents in the rst generation are endowed
with identical prior beliefs. This is a natural assumption, since all agents have access to the same past
warfare history. The dynamics of beliefs is the driving force of the stochastic process of war and peace
and trade in this economy.
Denition 3 A Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium (DSE) is a sequence of PBE with an associated
sequence of beliefs such that, given an initial likelihood ratio r0 the posterior likelihood ratio at t is the
prior likelihood ratio at t+ 1; for all t  0.
It is useful to distinguish between two parametric cases. In the rst case, the value of war is
high (V > S  (1)), and the DSE can converge to an uninformative PBE with pessimistic beliefs, but
not to an uninformative PBE with optimistic beliefs. In the second case, the value of war is lower
(V 2 [S+ (0) ; S  (1)]), and the DSE can converge with positive probability to both an uninformative
PBE with pessimistic beliefs, and an uninformative PBE with optimistic beliefs.
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3.1 High Value of War
The following Proposition characterizes the dynamic equilibrium when the value of war is high (the
proof follows immediately from Lemma 1 and its proof, and is omitted).
Proposition 4 Assume V > S  (1) and the selection criterion of Assumption 3. Let r (V ) be dened
as in (7). The DSE is characterized as follows:
The PBE at time t is unique and given by Proposition 3, after setting r 1 = rt 1. In particular, if
rt 1 < r (V ) ; then both types choose war under BAU (+ (rt 1) =   (rt 1) = 0), and the PBE is
uninformative. If rt 1  r (V ) ; then the low type chooses war while the high type chooses peace under
BAU (+ (rt 1) = 1 and   (rt 1) = 0), and the PBE is informative.
The equilibrium law of motion of beliefs is given by the following stochastic process:
ln rt =
8><>:
ln rt 1 if rt 1 2 [0; r (V )]
ln rt 1 + (1  IWAR;t) ln

1 W
P

  IWAR;t ln

1 P
W

if rt 1 > r (V )
(9)
where IWAR 2 f0; 1g is an indicator function of war, with the following conditional probability
Pr (IWAR;t = 1j rt 1) =
8<:
1  P if rt 1 2 [0; r (V )]
I   (1  P ) + (1  I )  W if rt 1 > r (V )
: (10)
where I  2 f0; 1g is an indicator functions of fk =  g.
The stochastic process (9) is represented in Figure 3. Note that, conditional on rt 1; the realizations
of rt are independent of k: However, the probability of peace and war do depend on k; as in equation
(10).
Suppose, rst, that the true state of nature is k =  : In this case, the probability of war is high
for all levels of rt 1 see equation (10). Interestingly, group B never learns with certainty that A has
a low propensity to trade, as learning comes to a halt as soon as r falls below the barrier r (V ). On
the contrary, a low-probability long sequence of peace episodes could make group B converge almost
surely to the false belief that k = +: However, we will see that when k =   the probability that such
incorrect learning occurs is zero.
Consider, next, the case in which k = +: In this case, if the economy starts with r0 > r (V ) ; the
probability of war is low. Yet, an unlucky sequence of war shocks can spoil trust. As r falls below
the barrier r (V ), the probability of war increases discretely from W to 1   P : Moreover, agents
rationally stop updating their beliefs, and even a long sequence of peace episodes fails to restore trust.
We introduce now a formal denition of a war-dominated learning trap.18
18Some of the states in the WDLT are non-recurrent, namely, they cannot be reached unless they are chosen as initial
conditions. Figure 3 shows the lower bound to the set of recurrent states, W
1 P r (V ) :
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Figure 3: Dynamics of beliefs
Denition 4 A war-dominated learning trap (WDLT) is a set of states, 
WDLT  R+; such that if
rt 2 
WDLT then 8s  t; rs = rt; and the incidence of war is high, Pr (IWAR;s = 1) = 1  P , for all
continuation paths [rs]
1
s=t :
It follows immediately from Proposition 4 that 
WDLT = [0; r (V )]:
Since, given any rt =2 
WDLT , there exists a nite number of war episodes leading into 
WDLT , the
economy falls into the WDLT with a positive probability. Does this imply that the DSE necessarily
converge in probability to the WDLT? The answer is not straightforward, as Figure 3 suggests. On
the one hand, when r > r (V ), peace is common fare, so there is a high probability that trust increases
over time. Positive updating never comes to a halt, as there is no upper barrier and rt can grow
without bound. On the other hand, whatever high level of trust has been achieved, a su¢ ciently long
sequence of war shocks can destroy it and drive the economy into the WDLT. Thankfully, this need
not be the case. We show below that the stochastic process of rt can cross at some point in time the
barrier r (V ) ; but can also alternatively end in an almost correct learning, ln rt ! +1; without ever
falling into the low-trust trap. Both long-run outcomes occur with positive probability.
The stochastic process for ln rt is an asymmetric random walk with a drift. Given an initial con-
dition ln r0  ln r (V ) ; and an unobserved true state of nature k 2 f+; g; a key step towards the
characterization of the long-run distribution is the determination of the rst passage time of the ran-
dom walk below the barrier ln r (V ) : T = minft; ln rt  ln r (V )g: If this stopping time T is nite,
it means that learning stops in T and priors are trapped in the WDLT. If the stopping time T is
innite, then learning takes place at each period in time and one must study under which condition
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the process converges toward perfect learning. Applying methods from stopping-time theory (see, e.g.,
Shreve 2004), we establish the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that V > S  (1) and let r0 =2 
WDLT : Then:
(i) If k =   the DSE enters the WDLT in nite time almost surely: Pr f9T <1j rT 2 
WDLT g =
1:
(ii) If k = +; the DSE enters the WDLT in nite time with probability Pr f9T <1j rT 2 
WDLT g =
PWDLT (r0) 2 (0; 1). With probability 1   PWDLT (r0) ; the DSE converges to perfect learning, i.e.,
rt ! 1, and to a low war incidence, Pr (IWAR;t = 1) ! W : The probability PWDLT (r0) has the
following bounds:
0 <
W
1  P
r (V )
r0
< PWDLT (r0)  r (V )
r0
< 1:
The technical intuition of Proposition 5 is the following: When the true state of nature is k =  
the stochastic process r cannot stay forever in the region of the informative equilibrium. Were this
true, agents would observe an innite number of realizations of the war/peace process. Then, by the
strong law of large numbers, the empirical frequency of war/peace would converge to the underlying
probabilities (1 P ; P ). Hence, agents would learn that the state of nature is  , namely ln rt !  1.
However, this would imply that at some nite T , rT falls below r (V ) and the economy enters the
WDLT. When the true state of nature is k = +; a positive-probability set of nite sequences of
wars drives rt below r (V ) : In this case, group B stops learning and the economy is trapped in a
WDLT. However, the probability of falling into a WDLT is less than unity. With the complement
probability no such sequence is realized, and r never exits from the region [r (V ) ;1). In this case,
group B observes an innite number of realizations of the war/peace process, and the strong law of
large numbers ensures then that the empirical frequency of war/peace converges to the underlying
probabilities (W ; 1   W ). Thus, group B ultimately learns that the true state of nature is almost
surely k = +:
For general parameter values, we can only provide bounds to the probability of falling into the
WDLT. The expression of the bounds is very simple. Both the lower and upper bound decrease with
the distance between the prior and the barrier: the higher the trust, the less likely the barrier will
ever be reached. Interestingly, the probability of ever falling into a WDLT decreases after a sequence
of peace episodes. Thus, peace fosters trust and decreases the probability of falling into the war
trap. Conversely, a few war incidents increase the risk of an irreversible crisis. The lower bound of
PWDLT (r0) also increases with W = (1  P ) : This is intuitive, as this ratio is inversely related to the
informational value of the war/peace signal. If this ratio were unity, the two states of nature would
be observationally equivalent and there would be no learning. Moreover, as should be expected, since
r (V ) is non-decreasing in V , the probability for the economy to fall into a WDLT is non-decreasing
in the value of war, V .
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A direct consequence of Proposition 5 is that after a war the probability for an economy to enter
a trap increases. IWAR;t = 1 implies rt+1=rt =
W
1 P < 1: Hence we get
1 <
Pr f9T <1; rT 2 
WDLT j IWAR;t = 1; rtg
Pr f9T <1; rT 2 
WDLT j rtg <

1  P
W
2
In the particular case in which W = P = ; we can obtain an exact characterization of PWDLT (r):
Corollary 1 Assume that V > S  (1) ; W = P =  < 1=3 and let r0 =2 
WDLT : Then, PWDLT (r0) =

1 
0
where PWDLT (r0) is dened as in Proposition 5 and 0  dln(r0=r (V ))= ln ((1  )=)e: Further,
if T denotes the expected rst passage time T into the trap, then E(T j T <1) = 0=(1  2):
The term 0 yields the count of the net number of wars (i.e., number of wars minus number of
peace episodes) which are needed to drive the initial prior r0 below r (V ). The corollary is consistent
with the general discussion of Proposition 5. In particular, PWDLT (r0) increases with the noise term
. Moreover, after a war the probability of entering into the trap increases by a factor (1  )= > 1:
3.2 Low Value of War
In this section we analyze the case in which the value of war is low, V 2 [S+ (0) ; S  (1)].19 The main
new implication of this case is that there are two learning traps, one with frequent and one with rare
wars. A particular example is represented in Figure 4. In the range P  P the implications are
qualitatively identical to those in Figure 2. However, in the range P  P ; the trade surplus is larger
than the value of war for both types (S+(P ) > S (P ) > V ), and thus even the low type chooses
peace under BAU. In such a range, the equilibrium is uninformative and peace prevails even if group
A has a low propensity to trade.
As before, the process of revision of beliefs is characterized by equations (4)-(5) whereas the
mapping of prior beliefs into equilibrium strategies is characterized by (6). There is, however, a new
case: for a range of priors in the neighborhood of the threshold P (r 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]) the PBE is
unique and features the indi¤erence of the low type between war and peace. Then, group A chooses a
mixed strategy in the war game under BAU,  (rt) 2 (0; 1). In such a range, the informativeness of the
observation of war or peace decreases as we increase r until we reach r (V ). As rt 1  r (V ) ;   ! 1:
The intuition for why the PBE involves randomization is as follows. First, recall that in this region
+ = 1: Then, if   = 0, peace would be highly informative. Fast updating would increase the trade
surplus, making group A regret staging war. Conversely, if   = 1, peace would be uninformative.
The absence of belief updating would keep the trade surplus low, making group A regret retaining
peace.
We can now state the analogue of Proposition 4 for the low-V case.
19We do not study the case in which V 2 [0; S+ (0)]: This case is the mirror image of the high-V case, and features
learning traps with frequent peace but no WDLT. The region of parameters that sustain this type of equilibrium is thin
for reasons that will become clearer in later sections.
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Figure 4: Surplus from trade and gains from war as a function of beliefs in the presence of two traps
Proposition 6 Assume V 2 [S+ (0) ; S  (1)] and the selection criterion of Assumption 3. Let r (V ) 
(S )
 1
(V )
1 (S ) 1(V ) and r
 (V )  p1 W r (V ) : The DSE is characterized as follows:
The PBE at time t is unique and characterized by Proposition 3 after setting r 1 = rt 1. In particular,
if rt 1 < r (V ) the DSE is characterized as in Proposition 4. If rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]; the high type
chooses peace while the low type randomizes the war/peace choice under BAU ( + (rt 1) = 1 and
  (rt 1) = ^  (rt 1) =
(1 W ) rt 1r(V ) P
1 W P 2 [0; 1]), and the PBE is informative. Finally, if rt 1 > r (V ) ;
then both types choose peace under BAU (+ (rt 1) =   (rt 1) = 1), and the PBE is uninformative.
Given an initial condition r0; the equilibrium law of motion of beliefs is given by the following stochastic
process:
ln rt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ln rt 1 if rt 1 2 [0; r (V ))[]r (V ) ;1)
ln rt 1 + (1  IWAR;t) ln

1 W
P

  IWAR;t ln

1 P
W

if rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]
(1  IWAR;t) ln r (V ) + IWAR;t ln W r(V )rt 1r(V ) rt 1(1 W ) if rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]
(11)
where IWAR(t) 2 f0; 1g is an indicator function of War at date t with the following conditional proba-
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Figure 5: Dynamics of beliefs with two traps
bility
Pr (IWAR;t = 1j rt 1) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1  P if rt 1 2 [0; r (V ) [
I   (1  P ) + (1  I )  W if rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]
I    1  P   (1  P   W )^  (rt 1)+ (1  I )  W if rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]
W if rt 1 2]r (V ) ;1]
:
where I  2 f0; 1g is an indicator function of fk =  g.
Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium dynamics of beliefs, as given by equation (11). The main
di¤erence with respect to Figure 3 is that in the high-prior region there is no learning, since peace is
preferred by group A even when it is of a low type. Note that if the economy rst enters the range
rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]; and then peace prevails for another period, beliefs get stuck to rt+s = r (V ) for
all s  0: Namely, r (V ) is an absorbing state. Larger r are non-recurrent states, which can only be
reached if the economy starts there.
Denition 5 A peace-dominated learning trap (PDLT) is a set of states 
PDLT  R+ such that,
if rt 2 
PDLT then 8s  t; rs = rt and the incidence of war is low, Pr (IWAR;s = 1) = W , for all
continuation paths [rs]
1
s=t :
It follows from Proposition 6 and the denition of a PDLT that 
PDLT = [r (V ) ;1):
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Given an initial prior in the informative region (r0 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]); the economy starts in an
informative equilibrium and there are learning dynamics. Eventually, the economy gets stuck into
either of the two traps.
Proposition 7 Assume that V 2 [S+ (0) ; S  (1)] and let r0 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]: Then, in both states
of nature, k = + and k =  , the DSE exits the informative equilibrium regime almost surely, and
learning comes to a halt in nite time. The nal belief is such that with probability PWDLT (r0) > 0
the economy is in a WDLT and with probability 1  PWDLT (r0) > 0 it is in a PDLT.
When k = + the probability has the following bounds
r(V )
r0
  1 Wp
1 P
W
r(V )
r(V )   1 Wp
 PWDLT (r0) 
r(V )
r0
  P1 W
r(V )
r(V )
1  P1 W
r(V )
r(V )
When k =   the probability has the following bounds
p
1 W  
r0
r(V )
p
1 W  
W
1 P
r(V )
r(V )
 PWDLT (r0) 
1 W
P
r(V )
r(V )   r0r(V )
1 W
P
r(V )
r(V )   1
The intuition behind this Proposition is the same as in the discussion of the high-V case (cf.
Proposition 5). In both states of nature, the process of priors cannot stay forever in the informative
equilibrium regime. Otherwise agents could observe an innite number of realizations of the war/peace
process. Thus, by virtue of the strong law of large numbers, the empirical frequency of war/peace
would converge to the true underlying probability, which is either (1 P ; P ); if k =  ; or (W ; 1 W )
if k = +: This would enable agents to learn the true state of nature.20
4 Learning from Trade
In the analysis so far, the information set of group B was limited to the history of warfare. However,
the inference about group As propensity to trade could be improved if group B observed directly
part of the trade history. For instance, if public records existed of the outcome of past inter-ethnic
trade, group B could attain a perfect inference. Clearly, this would not be a realistic scenario, since
in reality cross-community trade and business links are decentralized and hardly distinguishable from
intra-community trade.
In this section, we expand the information set of group B. In particular, we allow agents to retain
some memory of the information acquired through their individual family trade history. To retain
tractability, we make the simplifying assumption that as soon as an agent invests and attempts to
20Contrary to Corollary 1 we cannot provide a closed-form characterization of the probability PWDLT (r0) when
W = P : The reason is that the stochastic process (11) is not a random walk, due to its behavior in the region
rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )].
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trade, she observes the true k.21 This ex-post "hard" information is not useful to the trader herself, but
can be transmitted to the o¤spring. Without additional assumptions, all families would learn perfectly
k over time. To prevent the informational friction from vanishing in the long run, we make the realistic
assumption that the inter-generational transmission of hard information is subject to shocks: with the
exogenous probability ; the child of an informed parent fails to receive the information. In this model,
 is an inverse measure of the e¢ ciency of learning from trade history, and 1= is the average number
of generations through which the family history is transmitted.
In summary, in every period there is both a hard information inow (uninformed families that
engage in trade learn k) and an exogenous outow. In war times, nobody trades and the net inow
is negative. In peace times, the net inow can be either positive or negative. This model captures
in a stylized fashion the notion that information depreciates: If trade used to be intense in the far
past, but it waned more recently, the information gathered through past trade fades away. This model
is tractable, since it reduces the heterogeneity of information sets within group B to a two-point
distribution: perfectly informed agents and agents who only observe the warfare history.
As in the benchmark model, we solve the game backwards. The distribution of beliefs in group B is
now more complicated. Besides uninformed agents who still hold a public posterior belief conditional
on the observation of peace/war, fP ; W g, there is now a share of perfectly informed agents. We dene
by   and +; respectively, this share of informed agents conditional on group A type being k =   and
k = +. Recall that all agents in group A know the type. However, agents in group B ignore it, and thus
the uninformed in this group cannot tell whether the share of informed agents is  =   or  = +.
Di¤erent from the benchmark model, the aggregate investment of group B is now type-contingent too,
as some agents in group B know k. More formally, agents in group A have perfect information and
observe nkB and their reaction function continues to be given by n
k
A = F
k
A(zn
k
B): In group B a share
k of the agents take their investment decisions under perfect information while a share 1   k take
a decision based on their common public belief P . For k 2 f ;+g the reaction functions of group B
are now given by nkB = 
k  znkA+ (1  k)  zE [nA j P ], where E [nA j P ] = P  n+A + (1  P )  n A.
Proposition 8 Under assumption 1, for a given
 
P ; 
 ; +
 2 [0; 1]3 ; the Nash Equilibrium of
the investment/trade continuation game exists and is the unique 4-tuple fn A; n+A; n B; n+Bg 2 [0; 1]4
such that nkA
 
P ; 
 ; +

= F kA(zn
k
B
 
P ; 
 ; +

) and nkB
 
P ; 
 ; +

is the implicit solution of the
following xed-point equation
nkB = 
kFB(zF k(znkB)) + (1  k)FB

zPF
+(zn+B) + z (1  P )F (zn B)

: (12)
The investment decision of agents in group A, nkA
 
P ; 
 ; +

; depends on both   and +;
despite the fact that group A knows its type. Indeed, both   and + a¤ect the investment of the
21Beyond its simplifying nature, this is an adversary assumption, since our goal is to show that learning traps are
a robust outcome even if one increases the extent of information available in societies. Thus, assuming that private
learning from trade is very e¤ective plays against our result. Less extreme assumptions would harm tractability, since
the entire distribution of private signals would become a state variable.
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Figure 6: Surplus from trade with exogenous 
uninformed agents in group B who ignore the true type. Due to the strategic complementarity, then,
  and + also a¤ects the investment of group A and of the informed in group B.
4.1 Exogenous 
To aid intuition, we consider rst an economy in which the proportion of informed agents is exogenous,
time invariant and common knowledge. Clearly, in this case + =   =  in equation (12). For a
given after-peace belief P ; the static equilibrium and the associated trade surplus now depend both
on the belief and on the share of informed agents: S (P ;) and S+(P ;).
Lemma 2 Under assumption 1, for a given (p; ) 2 [0; 1]2, a unique equilibrium exists and is charac-
terized by a 4-tuple
 
n A; n
+
A; n
 
B; n
+
B
 2 [0; 1]4 which is continuous and non-decreasing in P : Moreover,
the trade surplus functions S  (P ; ) ; S+ (P ; ) are continuous and non decreasing in P : S  is non
increasing in ,whilst S+ is non decreasing in . Finally, S (P
(+)
; 
( )
)  S+(P
(+)
; 
(+)
):
Lemma 2 yields the intuitive result that @S =@  0, while @S+=@  0. Consequently, the
wedge between the two surpluses increases in , @(S+   S )=@  0. Intuitively, as the share
of informed agents increases, the equilibrium outcomes in the two states of nature become more
separated, approaching the perfect information equilibrium as  ! 1. Such a divergence between the
two trade surplus functions makes war more and more informative for any given P : This in turn
makes learning traps harder to sustain. Figure 6 is drawn for the same distribution of investment
costs and parameter values as in gure 4. Hence, for the benchmark case of  = 0 the surpluses S+
and S  would be identical to the ones in gure 4, where both a WDLT and a PDLT exist. Initially,
increasing  simply reduces the range of posteriors consistent with the existence of two traps. A
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further increase in  rules out the PDLT (as shown by the black lines in gure 6 capturing  = 0:4),
and an even further increase eventually also rules out the WDLT (as shown by the light grey lines in
gure 6 capturing  = 0:8). The result that the range of sustainability of learning traps falls with 
is general.
In summary, this subsection has shown that learning traps are robust to the assumption that an
exogenous share of the population is informed about the type of group A, as long as the share of
informed agents is not too large.
4.2 Endogenous 
In this subsection, we consider economies with an endogenous proportion of informed agents who ac-
quire information through trade and transmit it to their o¤spring. This extension increases complexity
considerably as there are now three state variables to keep track of, (t; +t ; 
 
t ) 2 [0; 1]3. The PBE De-
nition 1 is modied in three respects. First, a strategy for an agent in group B species an "investment
action" for each of her possible types, informed or uninformed, and for each of the possible realizations
of the investment cost. Second, the PBE is dened up to a triplet, (t 1; +t 1; 
 
t 1) 2 [0; 1]3: Third,
the triplet
 
n At; n
+
At; nBt

is replaced by the 4-tuple
 
n At; n
+
At; n
+
Bt; n
 
Bt

; where
 
n+Bt; n
 
Bt

yields the
measure of agents who optimally invest in group B for each type k 2 f+; g:
The share of informed agents evolves according to the following law of motion:
kt+1 = (1  )[nkBt + (1  nkBt)kt ]: (13)
The set of informed agents at t consists of the children either of traders or of informed non-traders
which did not experience any memory loss.
Denition 6 A DSE is a sequence of PBE with an associated sequence of beliefs and a measure of
informed agents such that, given an initial condition (0; +0 ; 
 
0 ); the posterior belief at t is the prior
belief at t+1 and the law of motion of +t and 
 
t is given by (13).
As in the benchmark model, we dene the equilibrium in terms of the likelihood ratio r 
= (1  ). We rst extend the denition of learning trap to the new environment.
Denition 7 A WDLT (resp. PDLT) is a set of states, 
WDLT  R+  [0; 1]2 (resp. 
PDLT 
R+  [0; 1]2); such that if  rt; +t ;  t  2 
WDLT (resp. if  rt; +t ;  t  2 
PDLT ) then 8s  t; rs = rt;
and the incidence of war is high (resp. low), Pr (IWAR;s = 1) = 1 P (resp. Pr (IWAR;s = 1) = W ),
for all continuation paths

rs; 
+
s ; 
 
s
1
s=t
:
Note that we do not require the stationarity of +t and 
 
t for an economy to be in a learning trap.
Our aim, next, is to characterize the parameter range of  that is compatible with the existence of
the learning traps, given the remaining parameters. This is not straightforward, since the equilibrium
path is governed by a three-dimensional stochastic process
 
rt; 
 
t ; 
+
t

which admits no closed-form
solution. To achieve tractability, we make the following further assumption:
24
Assumption 4 B is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and A is uniformly distributed on [ xA; 1  xA]
with xA 2 f x;+xg and x < 1=2:
Note that this assumption is nested in Assumption 1 when z < 1  x: However, the results of the
next two Propositions are valid for any z 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 9 Assume V such that S+(0) < V < minfS (1); S+(1); 1=2g: (i) A WDLT exists if and
only if   W  zx=(1 + zx); (ii) A PDLT exists if and only if   P  1  (z2   x 
p
2V )=(z3  
z3
p
2V ); (iii) we have P > W :
To see the intuition, note rst that if families never forget, i.e.,  = 0, then the economy necessarily
converges to perfect learning. Intuitively, peace occurs with a positive probabilty, since P > 0.
Moreover, under peace there is some trade, and thus trading families learn. Then, the process converges
to the full-information equilibrium. Imposing a lower bound on  has similar e¤ects to imposing a
bound on the exogenous  in section 4.1. In particular, when  > 0 there exist upper bounds to +
and   corresponding to the limit of an innite sequence of peace realizations. This sets upper bounds
to the shares of informed agents, denoted by +1 and 
 
1. Suppose, next, that k = + and that the
state at t   1 is  rt 1; +1;  t 1, being such that both the high and the low type would stage war
under BAU so that rt = rt 1 under both peace and war. Then,
 
rt 1; +1; 
 
t 1
 2 
WDLT : Intuitively,
the share of informed agents cannot increase, since it is already at its upper bound. If such a share
falls, investments will fall too, strengthening further the case for war. Thus, uninformed agents never
learn, and the economy is in a WDLT.
Interestingly, WDLT are more robust to private learning from trade history than PDLT. More
formally, W < P . The key di¤erence is that in a PDLT beliefs are overly optimistic and, hence,
many agents invest and trade. The di¤usion of private information sets apart the state-contingent
equilibrium trade surplus (S ; S+); restoring the informativeness of the war/peace process (i.e. S  <
V < S+); and eventually destabilizing a candidate PDLT. While such a mechanism is also present in a
WDLT, it is dampened by overly pessimistic beliefs which keep trade low and so limit the accumulation
of information.22
Proposition 9 yields an existence result for learning traps. The next Proposition establishes that
economies starting in an informative equilibrium, (r0; +0 ; 
 
0 ) =2 
WDLT ; can actually fall in WDLT
with a positive probability as long as the WDLT is non empty (i.e.  > zx=(1+zx)). To this purpose,
we identify a nite time-passage T; corresponding to a non-zero measure subset of continuation paths
over the period 0; :::; T; such that
 
rT ; 
 
T ; 
+
T
 2 
WDLT : Basically, these paths include a sequence
of war shocks which manages to drive rT into a range of su¢ ciently pessimistic beliefs. Moreover,
22The di¤erence can be large, as shown by the following numerical example. Suppose that, on average, the propensity
to trade is 10% larger in the good than in the bad state of nature (i.e. x = 0:05): Assume, in addition, that in the absence
of private learning from trade, there would exist a PDLT and a WDLT "of equal size" (i.e., z = 1; V = (1 x)2=2). With
such parameter conguration the thresholds are equal to W = 0:047 and P = 0:5: Hence, family memory should last
on average no more than two generations for the PDLT to vanish (i.e.; 1=P = 2), while the WDLT is sustained as long
as memory persists on average for up to twenty one generations (i.e.; 1=W = 21).
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by disrupting trade, such sequence depletes the share of informed agents +0 such that 
+
0 =
+
T =
1=(1   )T < 1: When the pace of decrease of the informational externality of trade, 1=(1   ); is
larger than the informativeness of war, (1  P )=W ; this sequence of war shocks is able to drive the
economy into the WDLT.23
Proposition 10 Assume  > max

1  w1 P ; zx1+zx

: Suppose (r0; +0 ; 
 
0 ) =2 
WDLT : Then, the
economy falls into a WDLT in nite time with a strictly positive probability, Pr f9T <1; (rT ; +T ;  T )
2 
WDLT g > 0:
In conclusion, learning traps are robust to the presence of a positive share of informed agents.
However, as the share of informed people increases (i.e., as we lower ), learning traps with incorrect
beliefs become harder to sustain. Eventually, for  su¢ ciently small, such learning traps are ruled out.
WDLT are more robust than PDLT to private learning from trade. Economies starting in informative
equilibria can fall into learning traps even though agents learn from trade.
5 Policy Implications
In this section we outline some comparative statics and discuss policy implications of our theory.
Our model implies that larger individual returns from trade (i.e., larger z) make human capital
investments more attractive, thereby increasing the expected trade surplus (equation (2) shows that
@S+(P )=@z  0 and @S (P )=@z  0). Thus, policies subsidizing inter-group trade push up the
opportunity cost of war, narrowing on the one hand the range of beliefs for which WDLT occur,
and enlarging on the other hand the range of beliefs for which PDLT arise (more formally, this
corresponds to an upward shift of S+(P ) and S (P ) in the Figures 2 and 4). This prediction is
in line with the empirical results of Horowitz (2000) on a¢ rmative action and ethnic conict. He
nds that preferential programs aiming at improving the integration of less advanced ethnic groups
in the national economy have reduced the potential for conict in various countries such as India,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria.24 Since trade typically thrives in fast-growing economies, our theory
is also broadly consistent with the empirical nding that high economic growth reduces the risk of
war recurrence (Sambanis, 2008; Walter, 2004). Our theory also provides a rationale to subsidize
human capital investments which reduce inter-ethnic barriers. Public education initiatives promoting,
for example, the knowledge of several national languages can lower the obstacles to inter-group trade.
This is in line with the empirical ndings that higher education expenditures and enrollment rates
decrease the risk of civil wars (Thyne, 2006).
23Proving convergence to a PDLT is harder. We conjecture that convergence may occur under more restrictive
conditions. On the one hand, peace must occur to make beliefs more optimistic over time. On the other hand, this would
reveal to an increasing share of group B that group A is of the low type.
24Horowitz (2000) and Whah (2010) show that the programs since the 1970s of state-induced inter-ethnic joint venture
companies in Malaysia have in many instances enhanced trust between the Malay and the Chinese population and
resulted in lower social tensions. Similarly, Augenbraun et al. (1999) nd that microenterprise lending by donors in
Bosnia for inter-ethnic joint ventures has worked well, not only on purely economic grounds, but also in lowering tensions
between groups.
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Unsurprisingly, larger windfall gains from war (i.e., larger ~V ) expand the range of beliefs such that
the economy can plunge in a WDLT. This is in line with the empirical ndings that more abundant
natural resources hinder lasting recovery and fuel war recurrence (see, e.g., Doyle and Sambanis, 2000;
Fortna, 2004; Sambanis, 2008). International measures such as embargoes on arms exports to, or
natural resource imports, from regimes arising from ethnic aggression could limit trust depletion and
war recurrence.
Our theory has more subtle implications about the e¤ectiveness of international peacekeeping.
The model predicts that international peacekeeping e¤orts that limit themselves to "stopping the
shooting" will only have a short-lasting e¤ect on political stability. To reach a permanent e¤ect, e.g.
to get a country out of a WDLT, peacekeeping must be complemented rst and replaced later by
trade- and trust-enhancing measures. In fact, the prolonged insistence on external peacekeeping may
be detrimental, as it may undermine the externality of peace on learning and trust. In other words,
local groups may attribute peace to the presence of foreign troops, and fail to update their beliefs
about the propensity to trade of other communities. These predictions are in line with the conclusion
of a study on survival of peace duration by Sambanis (2008: 30): "UN missions have a robust positive
e¤ect on peacebuilding outcomes, particularly participatory peace, but the e¤ects occur mainly in
the short run and are stronger when peacekeepers remain." Indeed, he nds that the e¤ect becomes
insignicant once UN troops have left, and concludes that an enduring peace hinges on economic
development and the rebuilding of institutions rather than on past UN peacekeeping.
Similar conclusions are reached by Luttwak (1999: 37) who argues that simple peacekeeping 
without trade-promoting or trust-restoring measuresdoes not lead to lasting peace, but just interrupts
hostilities that will recur once the UN troops leave: "(Peacekeeping), perversely, can systematically
prevent the transformation of war into peace. The Dayton accords are typical of the genre: they
have condemned Bosnia to remain divided into three rival armed camps, with combat suspended
momentarily but a state of hostility prolonged indenitely... Because no path to peace is even visible,
the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies
and ravaged societies."
Our theory also suggests that policies targeting beliefs directly may be important, especially when
there is no fundamental reason for persistent distrust and war. If the state of the world was k = +,
there may sometimes be ways to credibly communicate this to the population (e.g., by documenting
and publicizing successful episodes of inter-ethnic business cooperation). There is empirical evidence
that inter-group prejudices can be reduced by targeted media exposure (cf. Paluck, 2009; Paluck and
Green, 2009). According to Palucks (2009) ndings the listeners exposed to the "social reconciliation"
radio soap opera in Rwanda were signicantly more likely to nd it "not naive to trust" and to feel
empathy for other Rwandans than the control group exposed to a "health" radio soap opera. Similarly,
Bardhan (1997) shows that direct targeting of beliefs of the Muslims and Hindus by spreading success
stories of cooperation can reduce distrust and the potential for conicts in India: "Public information
on what actually happened, on how a disturbance started, on who tried to take advantage of it, on
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instances of intercommunity cooperation in the face of tremendous odds. etc., if e¤ectively transmitted
in the early stages, can stop some of the vicious rumors that fuel communal riots and calm group
anxieties" (Bardhan, 1997: 1395).
6 Conclusion
The economic theory of civil conicts is rooted in the rational choice paradigm. In contrast, a number
of political scientists emphasize the notion of grievance (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Sambanis, 2001). This view is
supported by empirical studies showing that wars tend to reoccur more frequently if they are associated
with grievances and ethnic identities (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Licklider, 1995). In a recent survey
article, Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that incorporating such factors in economic models is one
of the big challenges of theory. In this paper, we take a rst step in this direction. We provide a theory
where asymmetric information and cultural transmission of beliefs explain why societies can plunge
into recurrent civil conicts. In our theory, conicts are not a mere explosion of irrational grievances,
but are associated with the collapse of trust, a notion that is closely connected to that of grievance.25
The persistent e¤ects of conict on trust, and the possible emergence of irreversible vicious circles, is
explained by a rational belief updating process under imperfect information.
We emphasize the link between trade and war, which has been highlighted in the recent literature
as an important factor explaining international conicts. We believe the link trust-trade-war to be even
more salient in the analysis of inter-community conicts within societies, where business relationships
(e.g., seller-buyer, employer-employee, supplier-producer, lender-borrower) are decentralized and do
not need the mediation of institutions that can aggregate and di¤use information.
While our current study presents a rational-agent theory, integrating more explicit psychological
aspects may cast additional light on the issues at hand. In some work in progress (Rohner, Thoenig
and Zilibotti, 2011) we nd that children who are exposed to war at a tender age su¤er from a
permanent decit of trust, and that the e¤ect is signicantly larger than for adults exposed to war.
To the extent to which the earlier age is especially "formative" in terms of beliefs and values, this is
broadly consistent with the view that war erodes trust. Finally, we abstracted from institutions. As
emphasized by Aghion et al. (2011), institutions and beliefs are not independent factors: on the one
hand, institutions can matter through their e¤ect on the trust-building process, whilst on the other
hand trust can inuence institutional developments that can deter conict. Studying these connections
is also left to future research.
25For instance, Downes (2006) writes: "The key issues concern the adversarys intentions... The process of ghting a
war gives both belligerents plentiful evidence of the adversarys malign intentions. Beyond the normal costs of conict,
civil wars are often characterized by depredations against civilians including ethnic cleansing, massacre, rape, bombing,
starvation, and forced relocation. These factors produce deep feelings of hostility and hatred, and make it hard for former
belligerents to trust each other. Belligerents have little reason to believe their opponents intentions suddenly have become
benign... Moreover, even if the adversarys intentions seem benign now, what guarantee is there that they will not change
in future? These issues are of critical importance."
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Appendix
A Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Under asymmetric information group B agents hold a prior P 2 [0; 1] on group A type. Perfect
information corresponds to the subcases P = 0 and P = 1: We provide hereafter the proof of
Proposition 2; the proof of Proposition 1 follows directly by setting P = 0 or P = 1.
We start by proving existence. Equation (3) implies that
nB = ~F
B (nB;P )  FB(z

PF
+ (znB) + (1  P )F  (znB)

); (14)
where ~FB is a continuous function with the following properties: (i) For all P ; ~FB (0;P )  0 and
~FB (1;P ) < 1; (ii) ~FB (nB;P ) is increasing and convex in nB; (iii) ~FB (nB;P ) is increasing in P :
Property (i) follows from Assumption 1. Property (ii) follows from the fact that (due to the standard
properties of p.d.f.) ~FB is a continuous, non-decreasing transformation of convex combination of
p.d.f. that are themselves continuous, nondecreasing and convex in nB, where convexity follows from
Assumption 1. Property (iii) follows from stochastic dominance. Given property (i) and the continuity
of ~FB, the intermediate value theorem guarantees that, for any P 2 [0; 1], there exists nB 2 (0; 1)
such that nB = ~FB (nB;P ) :
Properties (i), (ii) and (iii) guarantee jointly that the mapping nB (B) implicitly dened by (14)
is unique and is monotonically increasing. To prove uniqueness we proceed by contradiction. Let us
assume that there exists a second xed point n^B = ~FB (n^B;P ) :Without loss of generality we assume
nB < n^B: The xed point n^B 2 [nB; 1] can be written as the following convex combination of the
interval bounds: n^B =
1 n^B
1 nB  nB +
n^B nB
1 nB  1: Applying to n^B the convexity criterion of ~FB yields
~FB (n^B;P )  1  n^B
1  nB
~FB (nB;P ) +
n^B   nB
1  nB
~FB (1;P )
From denition of the xed points (nB; n^B) this inequality yields n^B  1 n^B1 nB nB +
n^B nB
1 nB
~FB (1;P ) :
This leads to ~FB (1;P )  1, which contradicts property (i).
Given the existence of a unique function nB (P ), the existence and uniqueness of n
 
A and n
+
A such
that n A = F
  (znB (P )) = n A (P ) and n
+
A = F
+ (znB (P )) = n
+
A (P ) follow immediately. Thus,
equation (3) has a unique xed point and denes a unique triplet of equilibrium functions. Finally,
stochastic dominance implies that
 
n A (P ) ; n
 
B (P )
   n+A (P ) ; n+B (P ) :
Let us now turn to the equilibrium value of the trade surplus Sk for k 2 f ;+g. Integrating by
parts (2) yields
Sk (P )  znkA (P )nB (P ) 
Z znB(P )
 dF k
= znkA (P )nB (P ) 
h
 F k
iznB(P )
+
Z znB(P )
F k () d
= znkA (P )nB (P )  znb (P )F k (znB (P )) +
Z znB(P )
F k () d
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From (3) we get that at equilibrium nkA = F
k (znB) : Combined with the previous equation this gives
Sk (nB (P )) = zF
k (znB (P ))nB  
Z znB(P )
dF k() =
Z znB(P )
F k () d (15)
Given that F k is non negative and nB (P ) is non decreasing in P we conclude that Sk (P ) is non
decreasing in P : Moreover F  rst-order stochastically dominates F+; 8; F+ ()  F  () : HenceR znB(P ) F+ () d  R znB(P ) F  () d: We conclude that 8P 2 [0; 1] ; S  (P )  S+ (P ) :
B Proof of Lemma 1
We rst prove that an uninformative PBE exists if and only if the prior is in either the range r 1 
r (V ) or r 1  r (V ) : Guess that a PBE exists. Since rP = r 1, r 1  r (V ) ) rP  r (V ) and
r 1  r (V )) rP  r (V ). Then, by the denitions of r (V ) and r (V ) ; both types nd it optimal to
stage war under BAU (+ (r 1) =   (r 1) = 0) if r 1  r (V ). Likewise, both types retain peace
under BAU (+ (r 1) =   (r 1) = 1) if rP  r (V ). The guess is then fullled, proving the "if" part.
To prove the "only if" part suppose, to draw a contradiction, that an uninformative PBE exists in the
range r 1 2 (r (V ) ; r (V )) : Then, rP 2 (r (V ) ; r (V )) : However, given a posterior in such range, the
good type would retain peace (+ (r 1) = 1) whereas the low type would stage war (  (r 1) = 0)
under BAU, contradicting the assumption that peace is uninformative and that rP = r 1:
Next, we prove that informative PBE exist if and only if r 1 2 [r ( V ) ; r (V )] : We consider rst
the subrange r 1 2 [r ( V ) ; r (V )]  [r (V ) ; r (V )] ; and prove that in this subrange there exists
an informative pure-strategy PBE such that + (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0: Guess that such a
PBE exists. Since rP =
1 W
P
r 1; then r 1 2 [r ( V ) ; r (V )] ) rP 2 [r ( V ) ; r (V )] : Then, by
the denitions of r (V ) and r (V ) ; the high type nds it optimal to retain peace (+ (r 1) = 1)
while the low type nds it optimal to stage war (  (r 1) = 0) under BAU. This fulls the guess,
establishing the existence of an informative pure-strategy PBE in the subrange r 1 2 [r ( V ) ; r (V )].
Next, consider the complementary subrange r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]  [r (V ) ; r (V )] : In this subrange,
an informative pure-strategy PBE such that + (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0 does not exist, since then
rP =
1 W
P
r 1 > r (V ) implying that both types would nd it optimal to retain peace, contradicting
that + (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0. However, there exists a unique mixed-strategy informative PBE,
such that the high type chooses peace (+ (r 1) = 1) while the low type is indi¤erent between war
and peace, and chooses war with probability ^  (r 1) =
(1 W ) r 1r(V ) P
1 W P . Bayesrule implies then that
rP = r (V ) ; fullling the guess that the low type is indi¤erent between war and peace (consequently,
war erupts with probability W < 1=3 if k = + and with probability 1 P  (1 P  W )^  (r 1) >
W if k =  ).
The fact that there are multiple PBE if and only if r 1 2 [r ( V ) ; r (V )] follows immediately
from the analysis above [note that in this range there exist three equilibria, since a mixed-strategy
informative equilibrium such that rP = r ( V ) also exists. However, if r 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )] the
informative PBE is unique].
C Proof of Proposition 5
The proof strategy consists of rst showing that the stochastic process (9) can be reformulated as an
asymmetric random walk with a drift on the real line. Then, applying the properties of Martingale
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processes, we characterize the probability of the stopping time Pr f9T <1j rT 2 
WDLT g : The
discrete-time nature of the process introduces some technical complications that would not feature in
continuous-time processes. In particular, in discrete time when the random walk has a drift there is a
compact set of possible stopping-time values, rT ; and which value in this set is reached depends on the
realization of the stochastic process (i.e., rT is not deterministic). This complication (which would not
feature in continuous time) does not arise in the particular case of Corollary 1 in which the random
walk has no drift.
The stochastic process (9) can be expressed, after rearranging terms, as
Zt =  + Zt 1  1 with probability (; 1  ); (16)
where Zt  ln rt=s;   d=s < 1;
  1k=+  (1  W ) + 1k=   P (17)
s  1
2

ln(
1  W
P
) + ln(
1  P
W
)

> 0 (18)
d  1
2

ln(
1  W
P
)  ln(1  P
W
)

2]  s; s[: (19)
Zt is a random walk with drift which is dened up to an initial condition Z0  ln r0=s: The process Zt
hits a downward barrier as soon as it falls into the range ]Z 1+; Z] where Z  ln rW (V ) =s < Z0.
Our next goal is to characterize the rst passage time T  minft;Z  1+  < Zt  Z < 0g: Our
approach generalizes the analysis of Shreve (2004, chap.5) to a random walk with drift. To this aim,
we dene a family of Martingales Mt(u) which corresponds to a deterministic transformation of Zt :
Mt(u)  eu(Zt Z) tF (u) (20)
where u 2 R and
F (u)  u + ln(eu + (1  )e u) (21)
Using the denitions (17), (18) and (19) we can show that equation F (u) = 0 has two roots. One of
them is u = 0: The other is u = u; where
u =  s < 0 when k = +; (22)
u = s > 0 when k =  :
Moreover, F (u) >
u!0 
0 when k =   and F (u) >
u!u 
0 when k = +:
The process Mt is a Martingale, since
Mt+1 = e
u(Zt+1 Z) (t+1)F (u) = eu(Zt+1 Zt)e F (u)Mt;
where Et[Mt+1] = Mte F (u)Et

eu(Zt+1 Zt)

= Mte
 F (u)(eu + (1   )e u + u) = Mt: Next, let
t^T  min(t; T ): Since a Martingale stopped at a stopping time is a Martingale,Mt^T is a Martingale.
Thus, for all t 2 N;M0^T = E0 [Mt^T ] : Hence:
eu(Z0 Z
) = E
h
eu(Zt^T Z
)e (t^T )F (u)
i
(23)
35
We will now show that there exists a range of u; u < min (u; 0) ; such that the process in (23) is
bounded as t goes to innity. To see why note rst that 8u < 0 and 8t 2 [0;1); 0  eu(Zt^T Z)  1
since Zt^T  Z: Next, recall that 8u < min(0; u); F (u) > 0: Hence, 8t 2 [0;1); 0 < e (t^T )F (u) < 1:
Since the process is bounded, we can apply the theorem of dominated convergence to (23), implying
that, 8u < min(u; 0);
eu(Z0 Z
) = lim
t!1E
h
eu(Zt^T Z
)e (t^T )F (u)
i
= E
h
lim
t!1e
u(Zt^T Z)e (t^T )F (u)
i
=
8><>:
eu(ZT Z) lim
t!1e
 TF (u) if T <1
lim
t!1e
u(Zt Z)e tF (u)  lim
t!1e
 tF (u) = 0 if T !1
This yields
eu(Z0 Z
) = E
h
e u(Z
 ZT )1T<1e TF (u)
i
: (24)
By the denition of the stopping time T we have ZT 2]Z   1 + ; Z]: This implies
1  e u(Z ZT ) < e u(1 ): (25)
We can at this point prove the following crucial Lemma.
Lemma 3 For k =  ;Pr (T <1) = 1: For k = +; 0 < e s(1 )e s(Z0 Z) < Pr (T <1) 
e s(Z0 Z) < 1:
Proof. Suppose k =  : From our discussion of (21) we have 8u < 0; F (u) > 0: Thus, the process
e u(Z ZT )1T<1e TF (u) is bounded between 0 and e u(1 ): Applying the theorem of dominated
convergence to (24) yields, then,
lim
u!0 
eu(Z0 Z
) = lim
u!0 
E
h
e u(Z
 ZT )1T<1e TF (u)
i
= E

lim
u!0 
e u(Z
 ZT )1T<1e TF (u)

which is equivalent to
1 = E [1T<1]
= Pr (T <1)
Suppose, next, that k = +: From our discussion of (21) we have 8u < u =  s < 0; F (u) > 0:
Thus, 8u < u; the process e u(Z ZT )1T<1e TF (u) is bounded between 0 and e u(1 ): Applying the
theorem of dominated convergence to (24) yields:
lim
u!u 
eu(Z0 Z
) = lim
u!u 
E
h
e u(Z
 ZT )1T<1e TF (u)
i
= E

lim
u!u 
e u(Z
 ZT )1T<1e TF (u)

which is equivalent to
eu
(Z0 Z) = E
h
e u
(Z ZT )1T<1e TF (u
)
i
= E
h
e u
(Z ZT )1T<1
i
(26)
Premultiplying inequality (25) by 1T<1 we have E [1T<1]  E

e u(Z ZT )1T<1

< e u(1 )E [1T<1] :
Combined with (22) and (26) this leads to
0 < e s(1 )e s(Z0 Z
) < Pr (T <1)  e s(Z0 Z) < 1
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If k =  ; Lemma (3) implies that Pr f9T <1j rT 2 
WDLT g = 1, proving the rst part of
Proposition (5). If k = +; using the denitions (16), (17), (18) and (19) we can rewrite the chain
of inequalities given by 0 < e s(1 )e s(Z0 Z) < Pr (T <1)  e s(Z0 Z) < 1 as 0 < W1 P
r(V )
r0
<
PWDLT  r(V )r0 < 1. Hence, with probability 0 < 1  PWDLT < 1; the process does not enter the trap
in nite time and stays in the learning regime. Finally, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers, the
process rt must converge to perfect learning, i.e., rt !1. This proves the second part of Proposition
5.
D Proof of Corollary 1
When W = P = , the state space of the stochastic process (9) is isomorphic to Z (e.g., the
termination value of the process is the same after the sequence war-war-peace and after the sequence
peace-war-war). This implies that the value of the belief at the stopping time T is deterministically
characterized by the initial condition: T =  (0) where ln ( (0) =(1   (0)))  ln rW (V ) <
ln ( (0) =(1   (0)))  ln 1  : Since the belief t 2 [0; 1] is a (bounded) Martingale, then
8t; 0 = E [t]
= 0  E [t j k = +] + (1  0) E [t j k =  ] ; (27)
The Martingale Convergence Theorem implies that t converges almost surely to a random variable :
When k =  ; the Strong Law of Large Numbers implies that  =  (0) :When k = +; the support of
 is equal to the two atoms f (0) ; 1g with a probability distribution (PWDLT ; 1  PWDLT ). Taking
the limit of (27) as t! +1 yields:
8t; 0 = 0  [PWDLT   + (1  PWDLT ) 1] + (1  0)  (0) ;
where,
PWDLT =
 (0) = (1   (0))
0= (1  0) ;
proving the rst part of the corollary 1.
To prove that E(T j T <1) = 0=(1 2); we return to the proof of Proposition 5, and note that
when W = P =  < 1=3 the stochastic process Zt in equation (16) is a random walk without drift,
i.e.,  = 0: Moreover,  > 1=2 i¤ k = + and  < 1=2 i¤ k =  : Thus, Zt = Zt 1  1 with probability
(; 1 ); where  = 1k=+(1 )+1k= : As proven above, ZT (where T denotes the stopping time)
is entirely determined by initial conditions: ZT = Z (Z0) where Z (Z0)  ln rW (V ) =s < Z (Z0) + 1
and (Z (Z0)   Z0)2 Z . Moreover, u = ln 1  (where F (u) and u and are dened by (21) in the
proof of Proposition 5, and u is the non-zero root of F ), implying that u is negative (positive) if
and only if k = + (k =  ): Equation (24) becomes, then,
8u < min(u; 0); eu(Z0 Z) = E
h
1T<1e TF (u)
i
: (28)
Equation (28) is the Laplace transform of the random variable T when 1T<1 = 1 :
8F > 0; E 1T<1e T F  = eu(Z0 Z(Z0)): (29)
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Di¤erentiating (29) with respect to F yields:
E
h
 1T<1Te (T+1)F
i
=  (Z0   Z (Z0))e u(Z0 Z(Z0)) @u
@F
Using (21) leads to
E
h
 1T<1Te (T+1)F
i
=  (Z0   Z (Z0))e u(Z0 Z(Z0)) e
u + (1  )e u
eu   (1  )e u
Applying the dominated convergence theorem when u " min(0; u) (and so F # 0) yields:
E [1T<1T ] = (Z0   Z (Z0))e min(u;0)(Z0 Z(Z0)) 1
2emin(u;0)   1 (30)
By denition,
E [1T<1T ] = E [T j 1T<1]E [1T<1] = E [T j T <1] Pr [T <1] : (31)
Setting ZT = Z (Z0) equation (26) becomes Pr [T <1] = e min(0;u)(Z0 Z(Z0)): Together with (31)
this leads to
E [1T<1T ] = E [T j T <1] e min(0;u)(Z0 Z(Z0))
Combining (30) and (31) yields
E [T j T <1] = Z0   Z
 (Z0)
2emin(u;0)   1 =
Z0   Z (Z0)
j1  2j =
0
1  2;
proving the second part of corollary 1.
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Webpage Appendix
E Multiple PBE and Mixed-Strategy PBE in Section 2.3.2
Consider Figure 7. The left-hand panel illustrates a case in which r 1 2 (r (V ) ; r (V )) and the
mapping from prior to posterior induces multiple PBE. The gure displays the relationship between
two endogenous variables: the war choice for the high type (+) and the posterior conditional on
peace (rP ). The black solid step function shows the optimal war choice for a high type according to
equation (6)  recall that in this range   = 0. Note that S+ (rP = (1 + rP )) = V at rP = r (V ) ;
implying that the high type is indi¤erent between war and peace, hence, any randomization between
war and peace is optimal. The grey schedule yields the Bayesian updating, corresponding to equation
(4). The crossing points pin down three PBE, corresponding to di¤erent self-fullling posteriors.
The intuition for the multiplicity of equilibria is the following. Suppose agents believe peace to be
informative (uninformative). Then, rP > r (V ) (rP = r 1 < r (V )); the trade surplus is larger
(smaller) than the expected benet of war, and peace (war) is strictly the optimal choice. This fulls
the expectation that peace is informative (uninformative). A third equilibrium in mixed strategies
exists, corresponding to the point where the grey schedule intersects the horizontal segment of the
black schedule. The mixed equilibrium is not stable to small perturbations of beliefs. The multiplicity
disappears when r 1 < r (V ) ; as the grey curve is shifted down and crosses the step function only
once, at + = 0. Likewise, there is no multiplicity when r 1 > r (V ) ; as the grey curve only crosses
the step function at + = 1. Therefore, multiple PBE only arise for a small set of the prior belief
space.
The right-hand panel illustrates a case in which r 1 2 (r (V ) ; r (V )) : In this case, the mapping
from prior to posterior induces a unique PBE involving randomization of the low type between war
and peace (the high type chooses peace with unit probability). The black solid step function shows in
this case the optimal war and peace choice for a low type according to equation (6) recall that in this
range + = 1. In this case, S  (rP = (1 + rP )) = V at rP = r (V ) ; implying that any randomization
between war and peace is optimal to the low type. In this case, however, only the interior crossing point
is a PBE. To see why the corners are not equilibria, suppose agents believe peace to be informative
(uninformative). Then, rP > r (V ) (rP = r 1 < r (V )); the trade surplus is larger (smaller) than the
expected benet of war, and peace (war) is strictly the optimal choice. However, this does not full
the expectation that peace is informative (uninformative), since + =   = 1 (+ = 1 and   = 0)
Therefore, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only PBE. Moreover, this equilibrium is stable to
small perturbations of beliefs. Increasing (decreasing) r 1 increases (decreases) the probability that
the low type retains peace. When r 1  r (V ) (r 1  r (V )) the equilibrium features pure strategies,
is uninformative (informative) and entails + =   = 1 ( + = 1 and   = 0).
F Proof of Lemma 2 and Propositions 610
F.1 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of this Proposition follows immediately from Lemma 1 and its proof.
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Figure 7: Multiple PBE and Mixed-Strategy PBE
F.2 Proof of Proposition 7
That the DSE exits the informative equilibrium almost surely follows from the proofs of Proposition
5 and of Lemma 3 (see also the discussion in the text).
Next, we must bound the probability of the rst passage time of a stochastic process with initial
condition r0. The approach is again similar to the proof of Proposition 5, although now there is both
a downward (r (V )) and an upward (r (V )) barrier. Moreover, the stochastic process (11) is not a
random walk, due to its behavior in the region rt 1 2 [r (V ) ; r (V )]. We decompose our problem into
two parts. First, we study the rst passage time of the process (11) out of (r (V ) ; r (V )). Second,
we study the behavior of (11) in the range (r (V ) ; r (V )). The latter turns out to be a one-period
problem which is simple to characterize.
Let us rst study the probability of a rst passage time of the random walk dened by (16),
(17), (18) and (19) in presence of a downward (upward) barrier Z  (Z+) and an initial condition
Z0; Z
  < Z0 < Z+: The method is very close to the one used for the proof of Proposition 5. Let
T  = minft;Zt < Z g and T+ = minft;Zt > Z+g: As discussed in the main text, the strong law of
large numbers implies Pr(T  = T+ = 1) = 0 and Pr(T  < T+ < 1) = 1   Pr(T+ < T  < 1).
Hence we can focus our analysis on Pr(T  < T+ < 1): Using the denition (20) we dene the
Martingale M t  eu(Zt Z

 ) tF (u): For all t 2 N;M 0^T ^T+ = E0
h
M t^T ^T+
i
: Hence,
eu(Z0 Z

 ) = E
h
eu(Zt^T ^T+ Z

 )e (t^T ^T+)F (u)
i
:
Following a similar line of argument as the one in equations (23) and (24), we obtain
eu
(Z0 Z ) = E
h
eu
(ZT  Z )1T <T+
i
+ E
h
eu
(ZT+ Z )1T+<T 
i
(32)
Let us consider the subcase k =  : From denition (22); we have that e u(1 ) < eu(ZT  Z )  1
and eu
(Z
+
 Z )  eu(ZT+ Z ) < eu(Z+ Z )eu(1+): Noticing that E [1T <T+ ] = Pr(T  < T+ <
1) = 1   E [1T+<T  ] ; we can take the limit u ! u > 0 into (32) and combine it with the two last
2
inequalities to obtain the following bounds
1  eu(Z0 Z+)
1  e u(1  Z++Z )
< Pr(T  < T+ <1)  e
u(Z
+
 Z +1+)   eu(Z0 Z )
e
u(Z
+
 Z +1+)   1
(33)
In the alternative subcase k = +; denition (22) implies 1  eu(ZT  Z ) < e u(1 ) and eu(Z+ Z )eu(1+)
< eu
(ZT+ Z )  eu(Z+ Z ): Taking the limit u ! u < 0 into (32) leads to an expression identical
to equation (33).
The process (11) restricted to (r (V ) ; r (V )) is a random walk. As a consequence, PWDLT (r0) is
bounded below by the lower bound of inequality (33) with the following barriers Z   ln r (V ) =s and
Z+  ln r (V ) =s: Now imagine that the process rst escapes the interval (r (V ) ; r (V )) by crossing
the barrier r (V ). By denition, the process (11) restricted to (r (V ) ; r (V )) is a one-period process
with a probability of not crossing r (V ) at most equal to W (resp. 1   P ) if k = + (resp. k =  ):
As a consequence, PWDLT (r0) is bounded from above by the upper bound of inequality (33), with the
barriers Z   ln r (V ) =s and Z+  ln r (V ) =s:
F.3 Proof of Proposition 8
For a given
 
P ; 
 
t ; 
+
t ; z
 2 [0; 1]4 let denote G+ (n ; n+) ; G  (n ; n+) the RHS of (12). Let dene
the function G such that 8 (n ; n+) 2 [0; 1]2;G (n ; n+)  [G  (n ; n+) ; G+ (n ; n+)] : An equilib-
rium of the investment game corresponds to a xed point of G: Following its denition we see that
G is a continuous map from [0; 1]2 to [0; 1]2: The Brouwer xed point theorem implies that G has at
least one xed point.
To prove uniqueness of the equilibrium we proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that G
admits two xed points n0 
 
n 0 ; n
+
0

and n1 
 
n 1 ; n
+
1

: We dene a  (a ; a+) 2 [0; 1]2 and
b  (b ; b+) 2 [0; 1]2 as the intercepts of the line n0n1 with the convex hull of [0; 1]2: By denition,
the points n0 and n1 are included in the segment [a;b] : Without loss of generality let us also rank
them such that n0 2 [a;n1] and n1 2 [n0;b] : In term of linear combinations we dene (0; 1) 2 [0; 1]2
such that
n0 = 0  a+ (1  0) n1 (34)
n1 = 1  n0 + (1  1) b (35)
Following assumption 1 we know that G  (n ; n+) and G+ (n ; n+) are convex (see the proof of
Proposition 2). Applying the convexity criterions of G  and G+ to (34) and (35) and using the fact
that fn0;n1g are xed points of G we get
n 0  0 G 
 
a 

+ (1  0) n 1 (36)
n 1  1  n 0 + (1  1)G 
 
b 

(37)
n+0  0 G+
 
a+

+ (1  0) n+1 (38)
n+1  1  n+0 + (1  0)G+
 
b+

(39)
The fact that a and b belong to the convex hull of [0; 1]2 implies that the set of equations (34)-(35)
and the set of conditions (36)-(39) are not mutually compatible. For example, let us consider the
subcase where a+ = 1; b+ = 0. Following assumption 1 we know that G+ (1) < 1 and G+ (0)  0:
As a consequence equation (38) rewrites as n+0 < 0 + (1  0)  n+1 while equation (34) rewrites as
3
n+0 = 0+(1  0)n+1 : A contradiction. The same line of argument applies to the ve other generic
subcases, namely (a+; b ) = (1; 0) ; (a+; b ) = (1; 1) ; (a ; b ) = (0; 1) ; (a+; b ) = (0; 1) ; (a ; b+) =
(0; 0) : We conclude from this discussion that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
F.4 Proof of Lemma 2
From continuity of the system (12) we get that the equilibrium value of
 
n A; n
+
A; n
 
B; n
+
B

is continuous
in P and :
Let us rst prove that for a given  the equilibrium value n B (p; ) is non decreasing in P :
We proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that there exists some compact subset of [0,1] such
that n B (p; ) is decreasing in P . A look at (12) shows that n
+
B (0; ) < n
+
B (1; ) and n
 
B (0; ) <
n B (1; ) : By continuity of the path

n B (P ; ) ; n
+
B (P ; )

P2[0;1] in the space [0; 1]
2 we conclude
that there exists (0; 1) with 0 < 1 such that
n B (0; ) = n
 
B (1; ) (40)
From (12) we know that any equilibrium is such that
n B   FB
 
zF 
 
zn B

= n+B   FB
 
zF+
 
zn+B

(41)
Combining (40) and (41) yields
n+B (0; )  FB
 
zF+
 
zn+B (0; )

= n+B (1; )  FB
 
zF+
 
zn+B (1; )

(42)
Following assumption 1 we know that FB; F+; F  are non decreasing and convex. So equality (42)
yields
n+B (0; ) = n
+
B (1; ) (43)
The two conditions (40) and (43) imply that 0 = 1: A contradiction.
We deduce from the previous discussion that n B (P ; ) is non decreasing in P : A similar argument
can be applied to show that n B (P ; ) is also non increasing in  and n
+
B (P ; ) is non decreasing in
P and :
Finally, it is clear that 8 (P ; ) 2 [0; 1]2 ; n B (P ; )  n+B (P ; ) : For a given ; it is true for
P = 0 and P = 1: As a consequence, if it was not true, there would be a  such that n
 
B (; ) =
n+B (; ) : Using (41) this would imply F
B(zF (zn B)) = F
B(zF+(zn B)), which is not compatible
with the fact that F  FOSD F+:
The trade surplus Sk (P ; ) with k 2 f ;+g is given by
Sk (P ; ) =
Z znkB(P ;)
F k () d
Given that F  FOSD F+ and given that n B(P
(+)
; 
( )
)  n+B(P
(+)
; 
(+)
) we get that the trade surplus
S  (P ; ) ; S+ (P ; ) are continuous and S (P
(+)
; 
( )
)  S+(P
(+)
; 
(+)
).
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F.5 Proof of Proposition 9
F.5.1 Investment/trade continuation game
We assume that the initial share of informed agents, 0; is CK. This implies that the initial condition is
such that +0 = 
 
0 = 0. For a given triplet (P ; 
+;  ) the stage game equilibrium is characterized
by (12). Given +0 = 
 
0 = 0 it is straightforward to show by forward iteration of (13) that for all
continuation paths we have n B  n+B and    +: As a consequence, for each (P ; +;  ) the game
equilibrium is given by the following equations.
Regime A: for   < 1   x
P z2
and + >  x+2xz
2(1 P )+(1 z2)
(1 P )(1 z2+x)z2 +
x (1 z2)
x+(1 z2)
P
1 P 
 ; the Nash equi-
librium is8><>:
n+B = z
 x(1 +)+(1 z2)++P (1+x)(1 +)+P z2(+  )
1 z2(1 P (1  )) ; n
 
B =
zP (1+x)(1  ) zx
1 z2(1 P (1  ))
n+A = 1; n
 
A = zn
 
B   x
Regime B: for + < min
n
1 P z2 x
z2(1 P ) ;
1 2P z2
z2(1 P ) +
P
(1 P )
 
o
, the Nash equilibrium is8><>:
n+B =
zx(++(1 +)P )
1 z2(++(1 +)P ) ; n
 
B =
zxP (1  )
1 z2(++(1 +)P )
n+A = zn
+
B + x; n
 
A = 0
Regime C: for   > 1  x
P z2
and + > 1 P z
2 x
z2(1 P ) the Nash equilibrium is8<:
n+B = z(1  +)P + z+; n B = z(1   )P
n+A = 1; n
 
A = 0
Regime D: for + > 1 2P z
2
z2(1 P ) +
P
(1 P )
  and + <  x+2xz
2(1 P )+(1 z2)
(1 P )(1 z2+x)z2 +
x (1 z2)
x+(1 z2)
P
1 P 
  the
Nash equilibrium is8><>:
n+B = xz
 1+(2 z2)++P (2(1 +)+z2(+  ))
(1 z2)(1 z2(+ P (+  ))) ; n
 
B = xz
 1+z2+ P (z2(+  ) 2(1  ))
(1 z2)(1 z2(+ P (+  )))
n+A = zn
+
B + x; n
 
A = zn
 
B   x
As a consequence, when P < x=z2; the economy is in regime B i¤ + <
1 P z2 x
z2(1 P ) . Otherwise it
is in regime C. When x=z2 < P < 1=2z2; the economy is in regime A i¤   < 1   xP z2 and 
+ >
 x+2xz2(1 P )+(1 z2)
(1 P )(1 z2+x)z2 +
x (1 z2)
x+(1 z2)
P
1 P 
 . It is in regime B i¤+ < min
n
1 P z2 x
z2(1 P ) ;
1 2P z2
z2(1 P ) +
P
(1 P )
 
o
.
It is in regime C i¤   > 1   x
P z2
and + > 1 P z
2 x
z2(1 P ) . Otherwise it is in regime D. When
P > 1=2z
2, the economy is in regime C i¤   > 1   x
P z2
. It is in regime D when + <
 x+2xz2(1 P )+(1 z2)
(1 P )(1 z2+x)z2 +
x (1 z2)
x+(1 z2)
P
1 P 
  and in regime A otherwise. A su¢ cient condition for regime
D to disappear is P >
x+(1 z2)
2x .
5
F.5.2 Existence of 
WDLT
Hereafter we rescale the problem in terms of odds ratio r  P =(1 P ):We rst characterize a subset
of the WDLT in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 Assume V 2 (S+(0);min (S+(1); 1=2)) : For all   zx= (1 + zx) ; there exists  r0(); +1() 2
R+  (0; 1] such that 
r; +0 ; 
 
0
 2 R+  [0; 1]2 j 0  r  r0(); 0  +0 =  0  +1()	 is a non empty subset of 
WDLT :
Proof. We rst provide a proof of this Lemma in the limit case z = 1: Then we consider the general
case z < 1:
Let us consider  2 [0; 1] and (r; ) 2 R+  [0; 1]. We want to provide a su¢ cient condition for 
r0 = r; 
+
0 = ; 
 
0 = 
 2 
WDLT . From denition (7)  r0 = r; +0 = ;  0 =  2 
WDLT i¤ for all
continuation paths

rt; 
+
t ; 
 
t
1
0
; rt = r and
S+
 
r; +t ; 
 
t

< V (44)
In all generality the stochastic dynamics of S+ are di¢ cult to characterize except if (r; +t ; 
 
t ) are
low enough. Hence we also impose the following additional su¢ cient condition which guaranties that
all continuation paths

r; +t ; 
 
t
1
0
evolve within regime B (see Section F.5.1)8<: 
+
t  1  (1 + r)x for r 2
h
0; x1 x
i
+t  1  r for r 2
h
x
1 x ; 1
i (45)
Within regime B the trade surplus is an increasing function of +t
S+
 
r; +t ; 
 
t

=
 
n+Bt + x
2
=2 =
(1 + r)2 x2=2 
1  +t
2 (46)
and the lom of +t is derived from (13)
+t =(1  ) = (1  IWAR;t 1)

rx+ (1 + x)+t 1

+ IWAR:t 1+t 1 (47)
We notice that the threshold +1 dened by
+1(r; ) = xr=


1     x

(48)
corresponds to the xed-point of (47) when IWAR;t 1 = 0 for all t: Moreover it is clear from (47) that
+t 1  +1 implies +t  +1: We impose an additional su¢ cient condition on the initial condition,
namely that
  +1(r; ) (49)
This implies +t  +1(r; ) for all continuation paths

r; +t ; 
 
t
1
0
. As a consequence, for all contin-
uation paths S+
 
r; +t ; 
 
t
  S+  r; +1;  t . Combining (46) and (48), we get that the su¢ cient
condition (45) becomes
  (r) 
8>><>>:
(1 x)x
1=(1+r) x2 for r 2
h
0; x1 x
i
1 x=p2V
1 (1+x)=p2V+1=(1+r)x for r 2
h
x
1 x ; 1
i (50)
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and the necessary and su¢ cient condition (44) becomes
   (r)  1  x=
p
2V
1 + 1=x (1 + r)  (1 + x) =p2V (51)
The two functions (r) and  (r) are upward-sloping with (0) =  (0) = x= (1 + x) : Moreover,
V 2 [S+ (0) ; S  (1)] implies V  1=2, which in turn implies 0(0) <  0(0): By LHospital rule this
implies that there exists an open neighborhood of r = 0 such that (r) <  (r): Moreover, for the set
f(r; ) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] j   (r) and    (r)g the two conditions (50) and (51) are veried. We dene
  1() for  2 [0; r] and r0()    1(r) for  2 [r; 1] and +1()  +1(r0(); ) where +1 is given
by (49). Consequently, for any   x= (1 + x) ; the set 0  r  r0(); 0  +0 =  0  +1()	 is non
empty. Moreover, for all continuation paths

r; +t ; 
 
t
1
0
the condition (44) is veried; so
 
r; +0 ; 
 
0
 2

WDLT :
Let us consider now the general case z < 1: We intend to show that the conditions (r) and  (r)
still satisfy (0) =  (0) = x=(r + x) and 0(0) <  0(0): If correct, by LHospital rule, we deduce that
there exists an open neighborhood of r = 0 such that (r) <  (r): This allows us to conclude the
proof in a manner similar to the subcase z = 1: For z < 1 the su¢ cient condition (45) becomes
+t 
1  x
z2
(1 + r)  r (52)
The condition (46) becomes
S+
 
r; +t ; 
 
t
  x2
2(1  z2(+t + (1  +t )r=(1 + r))2
< V (53)
The lom of (61) becomes
+t
1   = (1  IWAR;t 1)
"
+t 1 +
xz(1  +t 1)((1  +t 1)r=(1 + r) + +t 1)
1  z2((1  +t 1)r=(1 + r) + +t 1)
#
+ IWAR;t 1+t 1 (54)
As a consequence the threshold +1(r; ) is now dened as the root of the second order polynomial
A1
 
+1
2
+ A2
+
1 + A3 = 0 with A1(r; )   z2


1    xz

and A2(r; )  1 
 
1 + r   rz2  
xz(1   r) and A3(r; )   xzr. For r close to 0; a rst order Taylor expansion leads to +1(r; ) =h
 A2(r; )
p
A2(r; )2   4A1(r; )A3(r; )
i
=2A1(r; ) '
r0
 A3(r; )=A2(r; ): For 1   xz this yields
+1(r; ) '
xzr

1    xz
(55)
The conditions (r) and  (r) are obtained by plunging +1(r; ) into (52) and (53). This leads to
  (r)  (1  x)x
(1  x) (x+ 1=z)  rz= (1 + r) (56)
   (r)  1  x=
p
2V
1  x=p2V

(1 + 1=xz)  rz= (1 + r)x
(57)
where condition (57) can be veried if and only if V > x2=2 = S+(0):
7
We want now to analyze the behavior of (r) and  (r) in the neighborhood of r = 0: First we
notice that (r) =  (0) = x=(x+ z): Secondly we get that 0(0) <  0(0) if and only if V < 1=2:
From Lemma 4 we see that   x= (z + x) implies 
WDLT 6= ;. This is a su¢ cient condition for
the existence of 
WDLT : We want to show now that this is also a necessary condition. We proceed by
contradiction.
Let us assume that there exists ^ < x=(z + x) such that 
WDLT 6= ;: Hence there exists at least
one couple
 
r; 
 2 R [0; 1] such that  r0 = r; +0 = ;  0 =  2 
WDLT : Let us consider r 2 (0; r):
We dene C(r; ) as the set of equilibrium paths

rt; 
+
t ; 
 
t
1
0
starting with the initial condition 
r0 = r; 
+
0 =
;  0 = 

:We compare it to C(r; ), the set of equilibrium paths
h
rt; 
+
t ;

 
t
i1
0
starting
with the initial condition
 
r0 = r; 
+
0 =
;  0 = 

. From Section F.5.1 we know that @n
+
b
@r

+; 
> 0
and @n
 
b
@r

+; 
> 0: Given that r < r and +0 = 
 
0 =

+
0 =

 
0 =
 a forward iteration on the laws of
motion (13) implies that for all path in C(r; ); at each period t; there exists a path in C(r; ) such
that n+bt  n+bt. As a consequence 8t; R+(n+bt)  R+(n+bt): Following the trade surplus denition (2)
this implies S^max(r; ) < S^max(r; ), where S^max(r; ) = arg max
C(r;)
S+: From denition (7) we know
that S^max(r; ) < V: This in turn leads to S^max(r; ) < V and so (r0 = r; +0 = ; 
 
0 =
) 2 
WDLT :
Any continuation path

rt; 
+
t ; 
 
t
1
0
of (r0 = r; +0 = ; 
 
0 =
) is almost surely in 
WDLT : In
particular this must be the case for the subset of continuation paths characterized by a non interrupted
series of war shocks over the period f1; :::; Tg: Given that this sequence has a positive probability
(W )
T ; this implies that (rT ; 
+
T ; 
 
T ) 2 
WDLT : From denition (7) this means rT = rt: Along
such a sequence of wars, trade is fully disrupted and the share of informed agents is depleted as
memory loss takes place at a pace : We have: ( T ; 
+
T ) = 
T (; ): As a consequence we get that
8T <1; (r; T ; T ) 2 
WDLT .
For ";  > 0; let us dene the set 
("; )  f(r; +0 ;  0 ) 2 R [0; 1]2 j 0 < r < "; 0  +0 =  0 < g:
From the previous discussion we see that 
WDLT 6= ; implies 9";  > 0 such that 
("; )  
WDLT :
The interpretation is clear: if the WDLT is non empty, it must include the cases where beliefs are
extremely pessimistic and the initial share of informed agents is very low. Hence there exists at least
one (r^; ^) 2 
("; ) such that (r^) <  (r^) and ^ < +1(^): Moreover, the same line of reasoning as
above implies that (r0 = r^; +0 = ^; 
 
0 = ^) 2 
WDLT for  = ^ ) (r0 = r^; +0 = ^;  0 = ^) 2

WDLT for  > ^:
In particular this is the case for any  such that (r^) <  <  (r^), a non empty range given
LHospital rule and the fact that (0) =  (0) and 0(0) <  0(0) . For such a  we have S+
 
r; +t ; 
 
t

<
V for all continuation paths

rt; 
+
t ; 
 
t
1
0
; starting with the initial condition
 
r0 = r^; 
+
0 = 
 
0 < 
+
1()

.
This means that condition (44) is veried; but this condition is equivalent to (51), namely    (r^):
A contradiction.
F.5.3 Existence of 
PDLT
This proof follows the same line than the previous one: For all   P with P  1  z
2 (x+
p
2V )
z3(1 
p
2V )
we
characterize a non empty subset of 
PDLT ; then for  < P we show by contradiction that 
PDLT
must be empty.
We rst start with the specic case z = 1: Let us consider  2 [0; 1] and (r; ) 2 [1;+1)  [0; 1].
We want to provide a su¢ cient condition for
 
r0 = r; 
+
0 = ; 
 
0 = 
 2 
PDLT . From denition (7)
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 
r0 = r; 
+
0 = ; 
 
0 = 
 2 
PDLT i¤ for all continuation paths rt; +t ;  t 10 ; rt = r and
S 
 
r; +t ; 
 
t

> V (58)
In all generality the stochastic dynamics of S  is di¢ cult to characterize except if r is larger than 1
and (+t ; 
 
t ) are low enough. Hence we also impose the following additional su¢ cient condition which
guaranties that all continuation paths

r; +t ; 
 
t
1
0
evolve within regime A (see Section F.5.1)
 t  1  x (1 + r) =r and r  1 (59)
Within regime A the trade surplus is an increasing function of  t
S 
 
r; +t ; 
 
t

=
 
n Bt   x
2
=2 =
 
1  x (1 + r) 
1   t

r
!2
=2 (60)
and the lom of  t is derived from (13)
 t =(1  ) = (1  IWAR;t 1)

1  x=r   x t 1

+ IWAR;t 1 t 1 (61)
This is an oscillating dynamics upper bounded by  max as long as IWAR;t 1 = 0 and condition (59)
is satised. Hence we get that    max implies that for all continuation paths we have  t   max
where
 max (r; ) = (1  ) (1  x=r) (62)
Combining (59) and (62), we obtain that the su¢ cient condition (59) becomes
  (r)  x
1 + x  x (1 + r) =r (63)
and the necessary and su¢ cient condition (58) becomes
  (r) 
(1 + r) =

1 p2V

  1
r=x  1 (64)
In the space (r; ) 2 [1;+1)  [0; 1] the two functions (r) and (r) are decreasing in r with
(+1) = x and (+1) = x=(1   p2V ): Given that (+1) < (+1) we infer that for all  
(+1) there exists a threshold ~r() such that 8r > ~r(); the couple (r; ) veries conditions (63) and
(64); this in turn implies that for    max (r; ) we have (r; ; ) 2 
PDLT :
Let us consider now the general case z < 1: Conditions (59) and (60) become
 t  1 
x(1 + r)
z2r
(65)
S 
 
r; +t ; 
 
t

=

z2r(1 + x)(1   t )=(1 + r)  z2x
1  z2(1  r(1   t )=(1 + r))
  x
2
=2 > V (66)
Moreover the law of motion (61) is given by
 t =(1  ) = (1  IWAR;t 1)
"
z( r1+r (1 + x)(1   t 1)  x)(1   t 1)
1  z2(1  r1+r (1   t 1))
#
+  t 1
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As a consequence we obtain
 max (r; ) = (1  )z
r   x
1  z2 + r (67)
Combining (67) with (65) and (66) we get the implicit denitions of (r) and (r) respectively
(1  )z r   x
1  z2 + r  1 
x(1 + r)
z2r
z2r(1 + x)(1   max (r; ))=(1 + r)  z2x
1  z2(1  r(1   max (r; ))=(1 + r))

= x+
p
2V
Taking the limit r ! +1 in the two previous equations leads to  max (+1; ) = (1   )z and
(+1) = 1   1z + xz3 and (+1) = 1  
z2 (x+
p
2V )
z3(1 
p
2V )
: Hence we have (+1) < (+1) i¤ V < 
x  z22 =2 = S  (1) : Thus, for all   (+1) there exists a threshold ~r() such that 8r > ~r();
the couple (r; ) veries conditions (65) and (66); this in turn implies that for    max (r; ) we have
(r; ; ) 2 
PDLT :
Let us prove now that  < (+1)  P leads to 
PDLT = ;:We proceed by contradiction. Let us
assume that there exists ^ < P such that 
WDLT 6= ;: Following the same reasoning than in the previ-
ous section this implies 9";  > 0; such that  r; +0 ;  0  2 R [0; 1]2 j 1=" < r; 0  +0 =  0 < 	 

PDLT . But this must imply that (r)  (r) for all r > 1=": A contradiction given that (+1) <
(+1). Finally, straightforward computations show that P > W .
F.6 Proof of Proposition 10
Let us consider a triplet (r0; +0 ; 
 
0 ) =2 
WDLT . Our goal is to show that there is a non-zero measure
subset of continuation paths

 t ; 
+
t ; rt
1
t=0
which enter into 
WDLT in nite time. To this pur-
pose we aim to exhibit a non-zero measure scenario over the period 0; :::; T such that
 
rT ; 
 
T ; 
+
T
 2

WDLT . The proof proceeds in two stages. First we show that with a strictly positive probabil-
ity the equilibrium path belief can go in nite time below the cuto¤ r0() as given by Lemma 4:
Pr f9T1 <1 j rT1 < r0()g > 0. Then we show that just after the threshold r0() is reached, there is
a non zero probability sequence of T2 consecutive wars which takes place over the time range [T1; T1+T2]
such that

rT1+T2 ; 
+
T1+T2

veries the su¢ cient condition of Lemma 4. Setting T = T1 + T2 we get
rT1+T2 ; 
+
T1+T2
;  T1+T2

2 
WDLT :
Stage 1: Given the initial conditions (r0; +0 ; 
 
0 ) =2 
WDLT there must be a subset S1; of strictly
positive measure, of continuation paths which violate denition (7). This implies that the rst pas-
sage time t1  argmin
S1
ft j S (t) < V < S+(t)g is nite. In particular let us consider the subset
1  S1 consisting of paths such that there is War at date t1: The subset 1 has a strictly positive
measure. Moreover we have: rt1 = r0 and ln rt1+1 = ln rt1  ln 1 PW : There are two possibilities. Either 
rt1+1 ; t1+1

veries condition (4) and the proof is completed. Or there is a strictly positive measure
subset S2  1 of continuation paths which violate denition (7). This implies that the rst passage
time t2  argmin
S2
ft j S (t) < V < S+(t)g is nite. In particular, let us consider the subset of 2  S2
consisting of paths such that there is War at date t2. The subset 2 has a positive measure and we
have rt2 = rt1 = r0 and ln rt2+1 = ln rt2   ln 1 PW = ln r0   2 ln
1 P
W
: This line of reasoning is applied
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for a nite number of N steps corresponding to the date tN such that ln rtN = ln r0  N ln 1 PW and
rtN < r0(). Then we know that the subset tN has a strictly positive measure and we set T1 = tN .
Stage 2: The continuation paths starting at date T1 are such that rT1 < r0() and T1 2 [0; 1]:
Let us consider the subset of continuation paths with a sequence of T war shocks over the period
t = T1; :::; t = T1+T: This subset has a measure (W )T > 0: Moreover, no trade takes place during the
sequence of war shocks. Thus, at date T1+T; and using (13), we get +T1+T = (1 )TT1 and r0() >
rT1+T and ln rT1+T  ln r^T1+T  ln rT1   T ln 1 PW where r^T1+T corresponds to the posterior belief
arising when all the stage equilibria are informative during the sequence of war shocks. By denition,
the cuto¤ +1(r; ) is increasing in r; thus 
+
1 (rT1+T ; )  +1 (r^T1+T ; ) :We now want to characterize
a nite time T such that

rT1+T ; 
+
T1+T

veries condition of Lemma 4: +T1+T < 
+
1 (rT1+T ; ). A
su¢ cient condition is +T1+T < 
+
1 (r^T1+T ; ) which is equivalent to (1 )T(T1) < xr^T1+T =
h

1    x
i
:
Taking the log and using the denition of r^T1+T this is equivalent to
T  log (1  )(1  P )
W
< ln rT1   log (T1) + log x  log


1     x

Clearly, this condition is veried for a su¢ ciently large (but nite) T if log (1 )(1 P )W < 0: Setting
T2 = T we get that

rT1+T2 ; 
+
T1+T2

veries condition of Lemma 4 and so belongs to 
WDLT .
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